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THE AFGHAN QUESTION.

SPEECHES
OF THE

! EARL OF NORTHBROOK

I

1

I N THE HOUSE O F LORDS,

I
AND

MEMOXZANDU-M
ON

VISCOUNT CRANBKOOK'S D E S P A T C H
T O LORD
OF

i

.

NOVEMBER

LYTTON
I ~ T H ,

1878.

ON VISCOUNT CRANBROOE'S DESPL4TCH.
When I rend Lord Cran'urook's despatch to Lord Lytton
.of the 18th of November, I thought that it mould give an
'incxrect impression of the negotiations which took place in
I873 between the Governlllent of Inciia, when I was Viceroy,
and the Prime Minister of Shere Ali. I have now had an
olyortunity of consulting the papers which have been
published by Her Majesty's Government, and my opinion
remains the same.
The acco~znt given in the despatch" seems to me to
imply that in 1873, 8her.e Mi, influenced by his fear of
'Russia, aslied for assurances of protection from the Government of Inclia, which I wished to give, but that I was
prevented by orders from home.
This is, in fact, the col~structionthat has generally been

" I refer to the following extract fiom Lord Cranbrook's despatch of the
'18th of November, 1878, Afghanistan Papers, p. 262 :"8. . . ,
The capture of Khiva by the forces of the Czar in the
spring of 1873, and the total subordination of that Khanate to Russia, caused
Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question the .ialue of the pledges
with reference to Afghanistan ~vhichhad been given by His Imperial Xajesty
t o England, and which had been conl~nunicatedto His Highness by the British
Government. Actuated by his fears on this score, His Highness sent a special
envoy to Simle in the summer of that year, charged wit11 the duty of expressing
.them to the Government of India.
" 9. Finding that the object of the Ameer was to ascertain definitely horn
far he might rely on the hell) of the British Governnlent if his territories Irere
threatened by Russia, Lord Nortl~brook's Government v a s prepared [telegram
from Viceroy, 24th July, 18731 to assure him that, under cestain conditions, t h e
\Government of India would assist hi111 to repel unprovoked aggression. But
Her Majesty's Government a t home did not share [telegram t o Viceroy, 26th
July, 18731 His Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed
the Ameer that the discussion of the question xx.ould be best postponed to a more
convenient season."
[Letter from Viceroy, 6th September, 1873, in Secret
(Letter, No. 76, dated 13th September, 1873.1

...

share 1li.s J:ir~u,'andconside
put upon the words used by Lord Cranbrook ; and, as I am
perfectly acvainted with the facts of the case, I think it i s
right, i n conlmon justice to the Government under which
I then servecl, to esplain as clearly as I can what really
ocwrred.
I n the beginning of the year 1873 it became necessary t o
obtain the consent of Shere Ali t o an arbitration which the
British Government had undertaken betmeon Yersia and
Afghanistan, -with respect t o the frontier of tliose cortntries in
the prorince of Seistan. I also n~isheclto inform him of the
particulars of the recognition g i ~ e nby Russia to the Afghan
frontier. I suggested, therefore, that he should receive at
CabuI a British officer who n~ouldbe able to esl~lninthese
matters to him. His reply was that if I wishecl it he wotdcl
receire a British cffiter, but that it wo~ddin his opinion be
more conrenient if, in the first place at any rate, his Prime
Ninister should vait upon me at Simla, in order to hear whak
I wished to communicate to hiin. I acceded at once to his>
suggestion, and his Prime Minister, Noor Mnl~omeclShah,
came to Sirnla in the summer of 1873. Shere Ali had, about
the same time, stated to the British Agent nt Cabul that hhe.
was m c h alarmed at the advance of Hussia i n the direction
of hlerve, and that he was anxious for more positive assurances.
of protection from the Gore;.nment of India against Russia
than h e had hitherto received. H e therefore authorisecl his
Frime U i n i i to take the opportuuity of communicating to
me his views upon that subject.
After a n interview with the: Prime Minister on the 12th
of July, I sent a telegram on the 24th t o the Duke of Argyll,
wlio was then Secretary of State for Inclia, in the following
words :" Ameer of Cabul a1:nned at Russian progress ; dissatisfied with
general assurances &ildanxious to know definitely how far he may rely
on our help if invaded. I propose to assure hiin if he unreservedly
accepts and acts on our advice in all esternal relations we will help hin~
with money, :mls, ancl troops, if necessary, to repel unprovoked
invasion. Me' to be the judge of the necessity. "
The Duke of Argyll answered on the 26th that
The Cabinet think you should infor111Ameer that me clo not at a11

him we sh;dl inailitl~ilr011r s
abides by our advice in este
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*hare his alarm,'znd consider there ir, no cause for it, but you lnoy assure
hiin we sh;ill iilaintain our sec.ttledpolicy in favour of Afql~anietan,if h e
abides by our advice in exterl~alz3l~irs.""

1 have given these telegrams in full, because Lord
.6ranbrooli appears to have snpposed tliat t l ~ e answer I
received was a refusal to sanction my proposal, that the
.assurances I wished to give were not given, and that the
Ameer was siniply told that the discussion of the subject w a s
postponed. This is not the fact. On the contrary, I
fconsidered that the answer I received authorisecl me to give to
the Prime Minister the assunances which I wislled to give.
1 actually gave him those asswances on the 30th of July, in
-the follosving terms, mhicli aye al~uostidentical with the molds
~f my telegram to the Duke 01 Argyll of the 24th : -

" The British Governlnent did not share the Ameer's apprehensions
((of attack by R ~ ~ s s i;a )but, as alreaciy meiltionecl 111 the previous
col~versation,it would bc the duty of the Ameer, In case of any actual
or threatened aggression, to refer tlie q~lestionto the British. Goverument, who would endeavour by negotiation, and by every means in
their power, to settle the matter and avert hostilities. I t wt~snot
intenclecl, by insisting on such previons reference to the British
Governmeilt, to restrict or interfere wit11 the pomer of the Ameer, as an
independent ruler, to take such steps as miglit be necessary to repel
a n y aggression on his territories ; but sucll reference was il preliminaqf
a n d essential condition of the British Government assisting liiln. I n
+iuch event, should these endeavours of the British GOT-ernnlentto
bring about an amicable settlenlent prove fruitless, the British
Government are prepared to assure the Anleer that they will afford
assistance in the shape of arms and Inoney, ancl will also in case of
necessity aid hiin with troops. The Britisli Government holds itself
perfectly free to decide as to the occasioll whell such assistance sl~ouldbe
rendered, and also as to its n a h r e and extent ; moreover, the assistance
will be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression,
a n d on his unreserved acceptance of the aclvice of the British Governlnent i n regnrd t o his external relations. "?
Bnt Shere A!i wanted much more than this. The
Prime Minister explained that he wished fop an unconditionrtl
guarantee of protection, and to receive an assurance that ,the
would be s~~pplied
with whatever money, arms, or troops he

-

" -4fghsnixtsn P~~pe;.d,p. 10;.

t Afgl~nnistanPapers, p. 114.

might ask for from the British Government in the event of:
attick. He also tvishecl for large grants of money and arms
to pnt his fortresses in order, and to equip his army. For all
this no return whatever was to be askecl by the British
Government from Afghanistan.
"
Such requests were, of course, quite unreasonable, and I
could not entertain them.
I addressed a letter to the Anleer on the 6th of Eeptembel;
a t the close of the negotiations, and after giving some
explanations of the corresponclence with Russia about the
Afghan boundary, I continued as follows :-

('The result of the con~mu~~ications
betveen the British and the
Russian Governments has been, in 1ny opinion, materially to strengthen
the position of Afghanistan and to remove apprehension of dangers
To this settlenlent the British Government are
from ~ i t h o u t . .
a party, ancl they are consequently even Inore interested than before in
%he maintenance of the integrity of your Highness's frontier. I have
had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy
which the British Governnlent would pursue in the event of an attack
upon your Highness's territories. A copy of the record of these
conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is, in my
opinion, one of such importance that the discussion of it should be
postponed to a Inore suitable opportunity.
-"I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to your Higllness's
territories from without, and I therefore clo not consider that it is
necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large
expenditure vitll a view to such a contingency. My hope is that,
Imving received the foregoing assurances, your Higllness will now be
enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and
improvement of your internal Government. The British Governnlent
desires to see your Rigl~ness'scountry powerful and independent. It
is my determination to nlaintain the policy which has been adoptecl
towards your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord
Mayo, and I repeat to your Highness the assurance given you at the
Umballa Durbar, that the British Government will endeavol.lr, from
time to time, by such meand as circunlstallces may require, to
strengthen the Government of your Higluless, to enable yon to exercise
piit11 equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to
your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the
lawful possessor.

.\

b

. .

"*

The ('record of conversations " to which I referred in my
* Afghanistan Papers, p. 11G.
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letter t o the Ameer, and which contained the assurances of
whkh I ]lave quoted, were formal documents, which
h a d b e e n translated and officially comm~micateclat the time
to the Ameer's Prime Ministel; and by mhich the British
~ ~ y e r n m e were,
n t in my opinion, bound.
I h a d received no instructions from Her Majesty's
G o v e r n m e n t to postpone the discussion of the question, and
m y reasons for writing in that sense to the Ameer were
explained in the following extract from the despatch from the
Goyernrnent of India t o the Secretary of State, of the 15th
of September, 1873 :-
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r c A copy and translation of these conversations" (containing the:
a s s u r a n c e s of protection) "u~ereannexed to tlie letter vhich the Viceroy
has addressed to the Ameer. But as the hLject is one of great
importance, and the Envoy appeared to doubt how far his instructions
j u s t i f i e d him in committing himself to any definite arrangement, we
c o l ~ s i d e r e dit advisable to postpone the settlenlent of it to a more
f a v o u r a b l e opportunity, when we trust the matter ]nay be cliscussed
with t h e Ameer-in person. "5

T h e result of the comm~~nications
which passed in 1873
b e t w e e n Shere Ali's Prime Minister and myself was that an
a s s u r a n c e of protection was given to Shere Ali, subject to
c o n d i t i o n s which I thought then, and stili think, to be
r e a s o n a b l e and necessary ; but that, as Lord Mayo had done
in 1869, I declined to comply with his wish for an unconditional gumantee of protection.
T h e neg.otiations of 1873 were approved by the Duke of
h g y l l , to whom they were reported in Septelllber of that
year, and I have never had any reason to suppose that they
were disapproved by Mr. Disraeli's Government, which
s u c c e e d e d to office a few months afterwards. In a debate
upon the question, xr13ich was raised in the House of Lords
by L o r d Napier and Ettrick, in June, 1574, Lord Derby,
representing the Government, expressed his opinion strongly
a g a i n s t granting an unconditional guarantee of protection to
Shere Ali. During the two succeeding years, when I was
V i c e r o y under the Administration of Mr. Disraeli, no
s u g g e s t i o n was made by the Secretary of State to the

" Afghanistan Papers, p. 109.

Government of India that the unconditionsll guarantee for
which Xhere A l i asked in 1873 ought to be given to him.
On the contrary, in January, 1875," Lord SaEsbury, who
was then Secretary of State for India, urged the Government
of India to press Shere Ali to agree to the establishment of a
British agency at Herat, a demand which his P i h e Minister
had told the Foreign Secretmy in 1873 would giv-e rise to
mistrust and misapprehension.f I n reply we expressed our
opinion, after consulting all the officers of the Government of
India, both European and Native, whom we believed to be
able to form a correct judgment of the sentiments of the
Ameer, tlmt he w o d d be found most unwilling to receive a
British Agent a t Herat, but that we did not think that his
objection would imply that his intentions had ceased to be
ioyal towards the British Government ; and we pointed out
that Lord Mayo had distinctly intimated to the Ameer in
1869, that no European officers wodd be placed as Residents
in his cities, $ W e snrnmed up our opinion in the following
words :-

" It is in our opinion essential that the proposed arrangements should
have the cordial consent of tlie Ameer. For the reasons given above,
we are of opinion that, if we were to press the question on the Ameer
at pr,esent, our proposals would in all probability either be refused or
accepted with great relucta~ice.
" If the Anleer should give an unwilling consent, the officers whom
we have consulted are agreed that no advantage would be derived from
the presence of a British -4gent a t Herat
" If the Anleer should refuse, his refusal would impair tlie influence
of the Government of India i n Afghanistan. It must either b e
accepted without any change being ln?de in our present policy towards
Afghanistan, in which case the Alneer would be encouraged to act up011
other occasions without regard to the wishes of the British Government ;
or we must treat it as a proof of unfriendly feeling on his part, modify
our present policy, retire from our attitude of sympathy, and withdraw
our assurances of support. If we are correct in believing that t h e
refusal would not shew the intentions of the Anleer to be disloyal, it
n-ould afford no sufEcient justification for a cl~angeof policy which
might throw Afghanistali into the arms of Russia upon the first
favourable opportunity. " $I

. . . . . .

" Afghanistan Papers, p. 128.
Afghanistan Papers, p. 94.

1. Afghanistan Papers, y. 163.
Afghanistan Papers, p. 135.
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Notwithstanding this expression of opinion on the psrt of
the Government of India, Lord SaIisLury, in Xovember,
1875: instructed us to enter into negotiations with Shere
Ali for the establishment of a British agency i n Afghanistan.
Neither then nor in the previous despatcli had Lorcl Salisbury
authorised us to offer to Shere Ali any more unqualified
guarantee of protection than was given to him in 187'3, or,
iadeed, any new concession whatever. We wcre, therefore,
obliged to ask for further instructions from B e r Ncijesty's
Government. W e thought that Shere Ali mould celtninly,
if he entertained the proposal at all, raise the q~~estion
of an
unconditional guarantee of protection, and we said to Lord
Salisbury in our despatch of the 28th of January, 1876 :--1" Your Lordship will doubtless have read the observations made by
the Anleer in May, 1873, and the conli~lunicatiollsxvhich took place
with Syud Noor Mshomed later in the same year on the subject of t h e
protection of Afghanistan. It then appeared that notl~ingshort of a
full and z~ncondltionalpromise of protection against foreign attack
would have been satisfactory to the Ameer ; consequently in t h e
Viceroy's letter to His Highness of the 6th of September, 16'73, t h e
questioil x.as deliberately reserved for future consideration. We ha&
no authority then, nor have we received authority since, from H e r
Majesty's Governnlent to give to the Anleer any such uzlcolldiiional
guaraxtee, and we are of opinion that there are grave objections
against b~ndingthe British Government by any such obligation. We
are precluded by l a a from entering illto a treaty of this nature without
the express conlmand of Her Majesty's Government, and unless such a
treaty is accompanied by reciprocal engagelnents on the part of the
Ameer, which seems to us to be inapplicable to the present conclition of
affairs. "

W e also felt it to be our duty to endeavour to induce
H e r Najesty's Governnlent to reconsider the conclusions a t
which they had arrived; and me ended our despatch in the
following words :"We h e a d y see the fruits of the conciliatory policy which has
been pursued since 1869, in the consolidation of the Anleer's power a n d
t h e establishment of a strong government on our frontier. The Ameer's
not unnatural dread of our interference in I t s internnl affairs and t h e
difficulties of his position, as described in our despatch of the 7th of
June last, combined, perhaps, x i t h tile conviction that if ever a struggle

* Afghanistan Papers, p. 147.

t Afghanistan Papers,

j 33 GeorgeIIII., c. 52.

p. 149.

10
for tlie independence of Afghanistan should come, me nlust in our own
interest help him, nlay have induced hini to assume a colder attitude
torvards us thail we shoulcl desire. B u t me have no reason to believe
that he has any desire to prefer the frienclship of other Powers. W e
are convi~~ced
that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards
Afgl~anistanby Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, whicll
it has been our earnest endeavour to maint;rill, presents the greatest
prolnise of the eventual establishinent of our relations wit11 the Ameer
on a satisfactory footing ; a l c l we deprecate, as involving serious.
danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British
Enlpire i n India, the execution, under present circunlstances, of the
instructions conseyecl i n your L o r d s h i l ~ despatch."
'~

to express the serious re]
occasions, me felt it to

9

I have alluded t,o this correspondence, not only to show
that down to April, 1876, when I ceased to be Viceroy, the
Government of India hacZ receivecl no indication that H e r
Majesty's Government were of opinion that the assurances
of protection given to Shere Ali in 1873 were i n s a cient ; but because the reference to this correspondence
in Lord Cranbrook's despatch" altogether fails adequately
+Paragraph 11, Afghanistan Papers, p. 263 :'' I n view of these interests, and of the responsibilities which had
nlorally devolved upon t h e British Government on behalf of
Afghanistan, looking also t o the imperfect information available in
regarcl to the country, in respect to wlGch those responsibilities had
been incurrecl, Lord Northbrook's Government had, in 1873, expressed
the opinion that the temporary presence in Afgl~anistan of a
British officer, as then proposecl by them, might do nluch t o allay any
feelings of mistrust lingering i n the minds of the Afghan people, and
might at the same time prepare the way for eventually placing
l,
and elsewhere,
permanent British representatives a t C a b ~ ~ Herat,
Encouraged by this opinion, H e r Majesty's Governnlent came t o t h e
conclusion that, although Lord Nortl~broolr's efforts to attain t h e
desired object had not met wit11 success, the time had come when t h e
measure thus indicated could no longer with safety be postponed,
Your predecessor i n Council had, indeed, whilst appreciating all the
advantages to be anticipatecl from it, frankly represented to H e r
Majesty's present advisers t h e clificulties attending the initiation of
i t ; he believed the time and circunlstances of the Inonlent t o b e
inopportune for placing British Agents on the Afgllan borders, and
wax of opinion that such a step should be deferred till the progress.
of events justified niore specific assurances to Shere -41i, which might
then be given in t h e shape of a treaty, followed by the establishinent
of agencies at Herat and other suitable places. H e r Majesty's
Government, however, were unable to agree in this view."
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t o express the serious representations wllic11, upon two
~ccasions, we felt it to be OLE duty to address to
H e r Majesty's Government as t o the results which, in
our opinion, woulcl follow from an endeavour to press
Shere Ali to receive British Residents in Afghanistan.
I n the proceeclings of the Government of India when
I was Viceroy to which I 1Ia-i-e referred, there was a n
unanimous concumence of opinion on the part of the
Nembers of my Council.
I n r d Cranbrook states in his despatch" that Lord Lytton
was instructed in 1876, " to offer to Shere Ali that same
active countenance and protection wllich he had previously
solicited at the hands of the Indian Government." Buut
h e adds that "it was clearly impossible to enter into any
formal engagement in this sense without requiring from the
b e e r some substantial proof of his unity of interests with
the British Government." The offensive and defensive
treaty, therefore, which Lord Lytton mas instructed to offer
did not contain, the unconditional guarantee of p~otection
for which Shere Ali asked in 1573 from the Gorernment
of India. " I t was clearly impossible," to use Lord
Cranbrook's words, to give him such a guarantee.
It appears from the papers which have now been
published that the sine p i 4 noiz of the treaty which was
offered Shere Ali by Lord Lytton, under the instructions
conveyed in Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 28th of
February, 1876, was that Shere Ali should agree to the
permanent location of British officers in Bfghanistan; and
$he heads of a treaty which the British Native Agent at
Cabul was instructed to esplain to Shere Ali i n October,.
l876,-F limited the gunrantee of protection which was
offered to him very much as I had limited it in 1873,
besides imposing upon him other conditions.
I think I have shewn that the inferences which have
been generally d r a m from Lord Cranlsrook's despatch,* Paragraph 12, Afghanistan Papers, p. 963.
Afghanistan ?apers, p. 184. Consult also Draft of Treaty t o be negotiated
by Sir Lewis Pelly, and side Mdmoire for Subsidiary Secret and Explanatory.
Agreement," pp. 189-1'31.

namely, that d e n I mas Viceroy in 1873, I wisiied to
.conlply with Shere Ali's request for assurances of protection,
but I mas over-ruled by the Honle Government, and that
-there was a change of policy with rezarcl t'o complying with
the request he made in 1873, after Mr. Disraeli succeeded
Mr. Gladstone aa Prime Minister, are not in nccordnnce with
the facts of the case.
I have confined myself esclusively i n this mernornndum
to the correction of seine 01, the incorrect inferences ~vhich
have been generally clra~vnfrom Lord Cra~lbrooli'sclespatch
.of the 18th of November. !I disapprove of the proceedings
of H e r Majesty's Government which have r e s ~ ~ l t cin
d war
between Great Britain and Afghanistan; but I shall reserve
the expression of my reasons for arriving a t tll:zt co~lclusion
until the meeting of Padinment. :I haye tllouglit it nligllt
not be xvithout advantage, however, to tile discussions which
will then take place, that I should put upon reeorcl my
-testimony upon matters of fact ns to which no orlo can Be so
well able to speak as I am.

SPEECH 03'

Ao

tA5

account of my a
in dealing -wit1
I n d i n . It al3p
t h e noble Visco.

~"\iOEtTHB~~OOK.
iVo~.ej~~be)'
SDth, 1875.

h a v e never ma(
h a v i n g endeavl
+,'his matter ; b

And i n

" Finding i
how far he lnig
territories wer
was prepred

I i n 1878, I a s h e d to
bsurances of protection,
Government, and that
;ard to conlplying with
,Er. Disraeli succeeded
hot in accordance with
i n this memorandum
p e c t inferences wlrioh
Cranbrook's despatch
we of the proceedings
I have resulted in war
In; but I shall reserve
Dg a t that c o n c l ~ ~ s i o n
bave thought it might
the cliscussions w h i c h
3ut upon record my
iich no one can be so

3
?i

45
8
4

SPEECH O F TEE EARL O F NORTHBROOK,
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the Eouse of Lol-rla, 0% Docenldcr Sth, 1878.

The Eanr, OF NORTHUBOOK
: My Lords, I rise to adclress
your Lordships on this occasion because it appears to me
that I am called '1113on to give eticlence on two points, on
both of which I am obliged to give it against H e r Majesty's
Government. The noble Visconnt opposite (Visconnt Cranbrook), in answering the speech of my noble friend behind me,
(Earl Granville) gave, as far as I coulcl follow him, a very able
aeco~mtof my actions and of the motives .chat actuated me
i n dealing with the Arneer of Cabul wllen I was Viceroy of
India. I t appears to me, however, with all clne deference to
the noble Triscount,that I am the only person who can state to
your Lordships ant1 to the country esnctly what I did when
I mas Governor-Genoral of India.
The question at issue between IIS is a very simple one. I
have never made any charge against the noble Viscount of'
having endesvourecl wilfully to misrepresent my condnct in
this matter ; but I am bound to say that the worcls used by
the noble Viscount in his desl3atch of the 18th of November*
last give the people of this country an entirely inaccurate
impression of what really happenecl at the time. That
inaccurate impression has not only been espressed i n the.
daily organs of the Press, but it bas also been expressed
to-night by the noble Lorcl the seconder of the Address. I n
Paragraplls 8 and 9 of the m b l e Viscount's despatch, hesays that' L Shere Ali, actuated by his fears on this score, sent a special
Envoy to Sinlla in the sulnmer of that year (1873) charged with the
duty of expressing the111 to the Gorenmle~itof India,."

And i n Paragraph 9, he says-

'' Finding that the object of the h n e e r was to ascertain definitely
how far he nlight rely on the help of the British Government if his
territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government
was prepared to assure him that under certain conditions t h e Gorrer~i-
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ment of India would assist l l i ~ nto repel unprovoked aggression. But
H e r Majesty's Goverlll~lellta t home did not share His Hjglmess's
apprehensions, and the Viceroy ultimately informeci the Ameer that
the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more
convenient season. "

KOperson who reads those paragraphs could come to any
other conclusion than that I wished to give certain assurances
-to the Ameer which I mas prevented from giving by the
Home Government, and that I was therefore compelled to
tell the Ameer that the discussion of the matter had better
be postponed to a future time ; and from another
.of the noble Viscount's despatch it has been natu~allyinferred that Her Majesty's present Government gave i n 1876
assurances to the Arneer which Her Majesty's late Government in 18'73 had refused to give him.
As regards the first part of the question, I am, as I said
before, the only person who can give evidence with respect
to it. The fact is, that having asked to be allowed to give to
t h e Ameer certain assurances, and having received a reply by
telegraph from the Home Government in answer to my
inquiry, I felt that their tele~a~-i~stifie&-~e,~in
giving the
Ameer the precise assurances I desired to give him, and
; which I actually did give him through his Prime Minister,
! an authenticated copy of those assurances being forwarded
( t o kin1 personally. So far, therefore, from the despatch of
"he
noble Viscount giving an accurate impression of what
E
; occurred, it gives an impression totally at variance with the
4 facts of the case. As the noble Viscount has gone into this
i.
: question at such length, and as the Duke of Argyll is unable
3 to be in his place to-night to explain his own conduct, I asked
! him to allow me to make use of any private letters relating
! to this subject which might have passed between us; and,
with his permission, I will read to the House a paragraph
\
? from a private letter I wrote to him two clays after I received
his telegram permitting me to give the assurance I desired to
give to the Ameer, and before I had the interview with his
Prime Minister. The words I used in the letter I wrote to
the Duke of Argyll were these-" Y2pr telegram"_of&ezh
will enable me to give him sufficiently distinct assurances.'
*-.TLis letter, therefore, entirely bears out my impression of
what occurred at that time.
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While I entirely acquit the noble Viscount of any
deliberate intention to misrepreserlt the matter, I cannot
help thinking that it is extremely unfortunate that he did not
.take mole pains to master the facts of the case. If he had
taken common pains to do so, he would never h a ~ allowed
e
the
paragraphs in his despatch to vhich I have referred to standr"
-ishe noble Viscount would have found my view of the case
Supported by the despatch of the noble Marquis opposite
(the Marquis of Salisbury), of the 38th of February, 1876,
who, in page 1-58 of the Papers, in referring to this question,
says :L C Ill t h e year 1873, Lord Nortllbrook ga1-e t o the Envoy of tlle
Anleer t h e personal assurance that in the event of any aggression upon
%he territories of His Highness, ~vl~icli
the British Gorernnlent had
failed to avert by negotiation, illat Governllle~ltwould be prepared
" t o assure tlre Ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of
arlns a n d money, and will also, in cases of necessity, assist lutn with
troops .'''

VISCOUNT
CI~ANBROOIC::
GOon. Read the next paragraph.
OF NORTHBROOK
: I will do so if the noble
The EARL
-Viscount wishes me to do so. The despatch goes on :LL
The terms of this declaration, however, dtl~ougllsufficient t o
justify reproaclles on the part of Shere Ali, if in the contingency to
which it referred he should be left mlsupported 1 q the British
Government, were, unfortunately, too anbiguous to secure confidence
o r to inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness. The Snleer, in
fact, appears to have remained under a, resentful i~npressio~l
tlmt his
Envoy had been trified with, and his attitude towards the Gover~unent
of India has ever since been characterisecl by allbignity and reserve."

That is an argument to which I will advert immediately.
A t present I am dealing merely wit11 the facts of the case,
and I think that if the nobleViscount had consulted the Papers
,carefully he never would have introduced these paragraphs
into his despatch. If any one vill read the 12th paragraph
.of Lord Lytton's despatch of the 10th of May, 1877, at page
162 of the Papers, it will be seen that the account of the
noble Viscount does not state the case accurately. There
is also the statelvent i n the conferences between the Prime
Minister of the Ameer and Sir Lewis Pelly, which gives a,
completely accurate account of the transactions of 1873.
The Prime Minister says that the assurances at his first

IG
interview were not sufficient, but that afterwards further
assurances mere given ; and if the noble Viscount desires
any further evidence, there is the language of Lord Lytton
in his letter of the 16th of March, 1577, to the Prime
Ninister, in which the assurances I had given in 1573 were
withdrawn ; all notice of which has been omitted by the
noble Triscount. Therefore, I say that even from the Papers
themselves the noble Viscount ought to have formed a more
accurate judgment of the transaction, ancl have avoided
mriting a paragraph ~vhichhas Iecl to such misapprehension
on the part of the public.
But that is not all. The noble Viscount has now upon his
Council three distinguished Indian statesmen who were Members of my Council in 1873, or afterwards-Sir Henry Norman,
Sir Barrow Ellis, and Sir William Muir-all of whom were
cognizant of these transactions ; n11d yet wi11 it be believed
that the noble Viscount has not taken the common precaution
of asking thein whether he n7as right i n his facts before
publishing those parstgraphs, and that the first thing that
they knew about his despatch was seeing it in the newspapers P If he had taken that precaution, the nobleViscount
would not have found himself in the diffic~dt position in
which he is now placed.
Esception has been taken by the noble Earl behincl me
(Earl Granville) to the lGth paragraph of the despatch
of the noble Viscount of the 18th of November, which
refers to the close of Sir Lewis Pelly's negotiations, and
I cannot 1001: upon the explanation of the noble Viscount
with respect to the accuracy of that paragraph as satisfactory.
I n the 1Sth pamgraph, moreover, the noble Viscount describes
the position of the Governnlent after the close of the negotiations as one of " vigilant reserve." The real position was
that on the 15th of March, 1877, the Viceroy had informed
the Ameel thnt ail the assmances of protection he had received
from Lord Lawrence, Lord Nayo, and myself, were repudiated,
and that the only engagement by which the British Government were bound was the Treaty of 1855, under which no
assurance of protection was give11 him. I clo not think anyone would dram any such inference as this from the account
given in the despatch of these transactions. Giving the noble
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Viscount every credit for a desire not to misrepresent the
facts of the case in his desp:~tch,I must say that anyono who
reads his conclusions, and then carefully examines t h e Papers
will be very much surprised.
There is another point in the noble Iriscount's speech t o
which I rn~lstallude, although it is orie on which I have no
personal knowledge. The noble Viscount i n his despatch
leaves it to be inferred tliat Her Majesty's present Government have given to tlie Ameer, or rather offered to the Ameer,
the assurances vhich n i s Eighness required from me, and
which I a a s not able to give him. The noble V i s c o ~ ~spoke
nt
in a condemnatory sense of the safeguards a n d cautions
attached to the assurances offered to Shere Ali i n 1873.
V ~ s c ; o c xC~i~ll11001i
~
: I must deny having expressed
the sentiment which the noble Earl imputes to me.
The EARLOF N O ~ ~ U L H:IThen
~OOK
I wish t h e noble
Viscotznt would not use lang~lagewhich is liable to misconstruction. EIis words abo~zt"vague" assurances certainly
seemed to imply t h t tliose assurances were not of a kind
which ought to lmve been given at the time. Now, I wish
to point out to your Lordships that the oifers made to the
Ameer by H e r Majesty's preseut Government were guarded
far more strictly than those of 1873. These papers
contain the draft treaty which Sir Lewis PelIy was
authol.lsed to conclude with the Arneer. My assurances
to the Ameer in 187:) were that the British Government,
under certain circumstances, would afford him assistance in
tlle shape of arms and ~noney,and also, in case of necessity,
assist him with tro01)s. The safeguards were these-that
he
sllould abstain fro111 aggression and should unreservedly
accept tlle advice of the British Ciovern~nentin regarcl to his
external relations. Nov, turuing to the draft treaty which
Sir Lewis Pelly was suthorised to conclude with t h e Ameer,
\v:~ich is given at page 190 of the Papers, what cclo 1 find ?
There is an assurance of protection, no cloubt, i n the second
Article, but it is qualified in the tllird and f o ~ r r t hArticles
in precisely the same uTaj- as the assurance of protection
given to the Ameer in 1873. The qualification is that H i s
Highness should " refmill from all provocation of, aggreson, or interference with, the States and territories

beyond his present frontier," and that " h e sh011ld
conduct his relations with foreign St:~tes in harmony with
the policy of the British Government." It appenrs that the
Viceroy was not quite satisfied with these conditions, and on
for subsidiary secret :and
looking to the "cci(le ~lie'tl~oirc
explanatory agreement," at page 101, yon will fintl that it
was understood, in regard to Article 2, that the hmeer
should " bind himself to abstain froill cliscussio11of political,
international, or State matters with any foreign Government," communicating unreservedly to the Ihitidi Government a11 communications on sucli sul!jerts receivc>il by Iiim.
I wish to show that if there is nny distinctioll Letwee11 the
terms offered to the Smeer by the Viceroy uuclcr ilistructioris
from the Home Governme~it, and the term^ \vliich were
proposed in 1573, the terms prolmsecl by Her Mqjesty's
present Government mere more strict than tllose of 1873.
I have thought it right to mention this, becnuse there is
great misapprehension on the subject.? It llas been said in
several of the nevspapers, ant1 notably by tllo 2'/iN J ~ I N
Gcczette, that the conduct of tho late Government to~vartls
Shere Ali was t>llewhole cause of the present W ~ L ~Shere
.
Ali, said the Pn71 f i l l Gnzetfc, wanted to throw himself
into the arms of England, and made n 111~oposnl
wllic6 Lord
Northbrooli mas willing to accept, but ~vliicllUr.Gladstone's
Government declined ; and out of that prol~osnlhas grown
the Afghan war. /Ilnowing the truth of this matter, as I do,
I cannot, in common fairncss and justice to tlit? Got-er11ment
under vhich I was then serving, refrain from ex1)lnining
what the real facts of the case are, a,nd I v e n t ~ ~ to
r e say
I slzould have taken the same coulrse if tl~ixsocir~un~stances
&ad occurred when the party opposite was in office, m d ~vhile
I was serving under the Earl of 13enconsficld.
I think the noble Marcyuis (tho Mnrcluis of Salisbury)
has very much underrated the impnrtnuce of t l l ~observatic~ns
of the noble Earl beside me (14l:~rl Grnnr.i1ll*) npon tho
debate which occ~medin this IIo~lsc0x1 thc 12th of Jurla last
to co~icc.i~li~l~
year. I db not think nriytlling which t~mo~uzts
frzm your Lordships facts whidl am known by Ministc,~
can be considered to be a " small 1)erzonal cjncd ion un~rvohhy
of discussion." It su happened t l d I touk r b very groat
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interest in the debate in question, and the account Tvhich the
noble Marquis has given of it is not one which I feel disposed to accept. My noble friend (the Duke of Argyll)
certainly did put some questions on particular points to the
noble Marquis, but he did not confine his speech to that.
If he had done so, I might have accepted the explanation
now given by the noble Marquis. My noble friend discussed the policy pursued by successive Viceroys towards
Afghanistan, remarking that the views of the last three
TTiceroys were that we should maintain an amicable and
watchful attitude towards the Ameer, without entangling
ourselves in permanent engagements. There can be only one
interpretation of what occurrecl. The Duke of Argyll wished
to receive, not only an answer to a particular question, but a
general assurance from the noble Marquis that he had not
departed from the line of policy indicated. I remember
hearing the noble Marquis state that affairs maintained a
peaceful aspect, and that there was '(no reason for any
apprehension of any change of policy or disturbance in our
Ifidian Empire." But the noble Marquis, in now quoting
*hat passage, omitted to quote the words "in our Indian
Empire."
I assert on my own authority, having been personally in
the House and having listened with the greatest care to what
fell from the noble Marquis, that I believed and accepted
those words to mean that there had been no material change
i n our relations with Afghanistan. That is not all, because
I adchessed your Lordships, and I gate the noble Marquis an
opportunity, of which he might have taken advantage, of
explaining the misconception under vhich I Iabourecl, and of
stating to your Lordships precisely the state of affairs as they
esisted at that time. As the matter is important, I must
trouble your Lordships with the few ~vords1 used on that
accasion. I said :-

'' The policy we have pursued v i t h regard to the Anleer has been to
show hiin that we desired to assist hiin with OUT advice whenever he
required it, and not to press upon him the presence of British oEcers
i n his territories, unless he really desires that tliey sliould go there,
a n d will give them a welcome."

I said :-

" That if that policy is deliberately adhered to now, as it has bee^
for many years, whatever suspicions may be entertained by the Allleer
will disappear ; he d l see that they have no foundation ; he will look
upon us as his best friends, to whom in certain circumstarices he
have to apply for assistance."
I added :" It is with great satisfaction I hear that the policy I have referre&.
t o H e r Majesty's Governnlent will continue to pursue."-[3 Hat~sctrd,
C C X X ~ ~ I - .1843.1

I therefore stated in the presence of your Lordships the interpretation I put on the words of the noble Marquis; and I
further said :-

" I an1 satisfied he has given us that assurance in perfect good faith,
a n d that we may trust hi111 not to resist any attenlpt to put it aside."
I f it had not been for that assurance, as I ~~nderstood
it, most undoubteclly I should have brought the question
before your Lordships. I mill not say what the effect of the
debate might have been, but, at any rate, before the war had
been entered into, this House anel the country would have
known what the policy of the Government was, and would
have been able to express an opinion as to whether that policy
was right or wrong, and whether we were t o drift into the
war in which we are now engaged.
As I have said before, this is nst simply a personal
question. I n dealing with distant countries great confidence
must be placecl in Her Majesty's Government, and great:
discretion must be used by those who differ from them. O n
such questions a Minister is required to be more careful
than in dealing even with European questions. I have said
what the assurances given were, and I have now to state what
were the circumstances at the time they were given. do f a r
from Her Majesty's G o ~ e ~ n m e not
n t having de~iredto enter
into any definitive treaty engagement, an endeavour had been
made to negotiate a treaty with the Ameer; and so far from
there having been no change in our relations with the Ameer,
on the 15th of March, 1877, the assurances that hacl beengiven to thc Ameer-of protection in the event of attack or
of internal disturbance-by Lord Lawrence, Lord Nnyo,
and myself, hacl been withdrawn under the instructions of
the British Government, any expectation of support from

;us had been repudiated, and he had been told that we were

under no engagement except that of the Treaty of 1855,
,under which there was no obligation on our part exc5pt to
;refrain from interference, and to leave the Ameer entirely
to himself. I was perfectly astounded by the condition of
khings revealed by the despatch adclressed to the noble
.Marquis by the Viceroy on the 10th of May, 1577, which
must have been in the hands of the noble Marquis at the
time he gave the assurances in the House of Lords in June,
1877, of which I have spoken. It is with deep regret I am
obliged to say this; it would not be right, the question
having been put, and the answer having been given, if I did
not give my deliberate testimony that the statement then
made by the noble Marquis gave rue a completely incorrect
impression of what the real facts of the case were.
I am not going now to enter into the general. policy of
&hewar; but I lllust say that I do not think the noble Duke
.behind me (the Duke of Somerset) was quite fair in his
semarlis a b u t the noble Lord, a late Governor-General (Lord
Lawence), for having joined the Afghan Committee. If my
noble friend had done such a thing in the sense of supporting
the Afghans against the British Government, no language
.would be too strong to be used in the circumstances. But as
matters stand, I am surprised at the noble D~ike'scondemna&ionof my noble friend. H e has an opinion that the war is
dght. Very good ; but my noble friend thinks it is unjust
and impolitic-an
opinion in which I myself all1 very much
disposed to concru with him. The noble Duke says that my
.noble friend is not patriotic ; but he would appear not to be
patriotic simply because he differs from the noble Duke, and
expresses the earnest opinions which he holds. Few n e n in
this country have given such proofs as my noble friend has
given of patriotism, of vigour, of honour, and of a desire at
any risk to maintain the British Empira in India ; and yet,
because he does not happen to agree with the noble Duke, he
is to be spoken of in such terms. It is repugnant to all my
feelings of justice and to every sentiment of propriety that a
man of such distinguished services should be so spoken of in
this House. My noble friend has a perfect riglit to express
his opinions on the causes of tlzis war, and to say whether he

txnlis it just or unjust. It is fol-tr-tnate that we have men
like him in the country, who know something of our former
relations with Afghanistan, and who can correct statements
which have been made and despatches which have been,
published by the knowledge which they possess.
One thing more. With regard to the Amendment pro-.
posed by the noble Earl (Earl Grey) I hope it will not be.
pressed to a, division. LTnfortunately, this discussion has
assumed a somewhat personal character. Nobody more,
regrets that circumstance than I do ; but from that very fact,.
if the Amendment were to be pressed, y o u Lordships would
be asked to vote upon a proposition which you have not yet
had an opportunit,y of fully and completely discussing. At
the same time, I must confess that 1 concur entirely withi
that part of the argument of the noble Earl which rests
upon the Act of 1858. I hold that it is not right for any
India to apply the.
Administration carrying on war o~~tside
towards the expense of such war
revenues of that co~~ntry
without the pre~ionsconsent of Parliament. I n this case
therewas plenty of time before the declaration of war for the
Government to have summoned Parliament and explained
their policy ; therefore, that would have been a proper and a
Constitr~tionalcourse, because there can be no d o ~ ~that
b t the.
Prerogative of the Crown is limited by Act of Parliament,.
and, although it is the Prerogative of the Crown to declare,
war, at the same tinze the clauses of the Act of 1858 proscribethe course that shodd be followed under the circumstances.
I t has been a matter of estxeme regret to me to be placed
to some extent in collision with the noble Marquis and the
noble Viscount opposite.
I have endeavowed since I;
retzlrnecl fro111 Indin to abstain from making unnecessarily
any observations on Indian affairs. I can say with perfect
sincerity that, both in and out of Parliament, I have
endeavoured to look at Indian affairs entirely apart from
party politics; and I should not hesitate for a moment to,
express my opinion as strongly with regard to anything done
by those on my own side of the House as with regard to theconduct of noble lords opposite.
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SPEECH O F TEE EARL O F NOBTHBROOK,
Ih tho Zouse of Lords, on Decem6cr loth, 1878.
--.

MT LORDS,-In addressing some remarks to your Lordships this evening, I mish to commence by espressing the
gratification which I have felt a t the gallantry which has been
shown by Her Majesty's forces i n t h e field in Afghanistan.
I wish also to express my confidence i n the officersin command
of those forces, Sir Samuel Browne and General Roberts,
who have conct~~ctecl
successful operatiorls in the field, and
General Stewart and General Biddulph, m-ho have had no
such opportunity yet, but who I am sure will justify their
reputation whenever they have t h a t opportunity. Having
been personally acquainted svith those officers, I believe that'
better selections could not have been made. The spirit which
H e r Majesty's British and Native forces have evinced cannot
be surpassed ; and I may be permitted to say that the general
efficiency of the army is, in my opinion, mainly due to the
administration of my noble and gallant friend, Lord Napier
of Magclda, who mas for many years Commander-in-Chief in
India, and of my gallant friend, Major-General Sir Henry
Xorman, who for a long period was Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, and afterwards
the Military Member of the Council of the Viceroy. The
general arrangements for the campaign, so far as we know
them, reflect great credit upon t h e Commander-in-Chief in
India, Sir Frederick Haines, who will, I a m sure, satisfactorily
discharge his responsible dnties ; a n d particularly upon the
Quartermaster-General's Depal'tment of the In&an army.
I must further espress my satisfaction, but not s~~rprise,
at the
expressions of loyalty reoeived By t h e Viceroy from Native
Princes of In.clia, some of them m y personal friends. The
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Maharaja of Gwalior and others have offered their personal
services-and those of their troops. Having so recently filled
the office of Viceroy i n India, I cannot pass these offers by
without expressing m y gratification.
I will now say a few n-ords on the main question
raised b y the Address to the Crown. Your Lordships
are asked to assent to the al~plication of the revenues
of India to defray the espenses of the war in Afghanistan.
My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble friend who
recently filled the office of Governor of the Presidency
of Madras (Lord Napier and Ettricli) in regretting the
course which Her Majesty's Government lmve talcen.
It would have been right, just, and generous to have
decided at once that no portion of the espense should
fall upon the revenues of India. I consider the war to be
the direct consequence of the state of afl~irsin Europ?, and
not to Izave arisen from anything immeciiately connected Tvith
our Indian Empire. For that re,xson, if for no other, In3ia
~houlcinot be called upon to bear the cost. Moreover, India has
suffered recently from two severe famines ; the people are
impoverished; and the state of the finances is far from
satisfactory. True, the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount
Cranbrook) toId us that the Government of India expects a
scrplus of amillion and a quarter this year above the estimates;
but this is exactly what I anticipated in the discussion of last
The reason of this s u ~ ~ > l uiss flint c s t m taxation
year.
has been unnecessarily imposed upon t h o people of India
for the purpose of raising what is called a Famine Fund.
The new taxes, which press upon the poorer classes, and
which I believe to be unpopular and impolitic, ought to be
taken off as soon as the condition of ihe finances will allow
of it.
I entirely agree with what has fallen from the noble Earl
on the woolsack, that it would be a s~lbjectfor regret if Indian
e
questions came to be regarded as party cpestions. I h a ~ never
considered them to be so ; and it was rathey a gratification to
me to hear the complaint of the noble Duke (the Duke of
Somerset) that there had been no great nloeting of the Liberal
party called together upon this question. As regards the speech
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of the noble Viscount who introduced this subject j'l'iecouut
Cranbroolr) I have nothing personal to complain of. H e is
correct in saying that there has been no reticence on the part
of tile Government in producing papers, and he has a perfect
right to criticise m y public conduct. I am the last person to
conlplain of any such criticisms. What I am now about to
say is the result of my actual experience in India. The noble
and learned Earl on the woolsack has given an account of the
objects of the Britis'l Government during the last ten
Years in dealing with Central Asia and Afghanistan. During.
that period there have been two Administrations-five Sears
under Mr. Gladstone m d five years under the noble Earl opposite. I was Viceroy in India during two years under Mr.
Gladstone's Administration and two years under that of the
noble Earl, and as far as I know, and so far as my dealings
with these affairs enable me to form an opinion, I have cot
been able to find out any difference ~vll%teve~,
during that
period, in the objects which the British Government desired
to secure vith regard to the progress of Russia in Central
Asia or to our dealings with Afgl~anistan; bearing in mind,
of course, that the general lille of pclicy must be modified
by the progress of events.
Having filled the high office of Viceroy in India, I think
i t is absolutely necessary, to avoid any misconception in
discussing the policy of the British Government towards
Russia in regard to Central Asia, for me t o say that the
Government of India, while I had any connection with it,
was not actuated by the fear of any attack upon India
by Russia. 'CVe never believed t l ~ n tsuch an attack was
possible, and me were of opinion that if anything of the
liind were possible the st2ength of the British Empire in
India and in this country was amply sufficient to render
such an attack futile, and clisastrous only to those who
might make the attempt. The Govelnments of England
and of India have never looked upon the progress of
Russia in Central Asia with the eyes of that school of
which Sir Henry Rawlinson, who has been p o t e d Isy the
noble and l'easned Earl on the woolsack, is the most able
I n 1869 the Government of India said :-

i
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"V
' Ve by no means share i n the exaggerated apprehensions expressed
in ~llailyquarters as to the danger 60 British rule in India vhich nlay
arise from a n extension of Russian influence in those countries lying to
t h e s o ~ ~and
t l East
~
of her enormons possessio~lsin Asia.
" We believe that the influence of a civilised European power over
wild and savage tribes cannot be otherwise tlliln beneficial.
" We would therefore heartily assist in establishing a, frank and
clear understailding wit11 Russia as t o the relative position of British
and Russian interests in Asia."

I n accorciance with these principles, they suggested
that, 8 5 it was for the interests of both countries that a
wide border of independent States shoulcl exist between
the British and 12ussian frontiers, it would be desirable that
Russia should be invited to adopt the same policy with
regard to the inclepencleilt States which came under her
legitimate influence, as the Government of India had
p u ~ s u e dwith regarc1 to Afghanistan and the i~ldependent
States within their influence.
H e r Najesty's Government entered into negotiations.
with ltussia with this ohjeot. The negotiations, commencecl
by Lord Clarendon and continued by Lord Granville, lasted
for several years. Finally, Russia accepted in 1873 the
boundary of Afghanistan suggested by the Government of'
India in the time of Lord Mayo, and it was arranged that
Russia should, to t,he best of her ability, prevent the Native
States on her side from creating any disturbance in
Afghanistan ; while we, on the other hand, engaged to.
exercise OUT influence to prevent the Ameer of Csbul from
transgressing the boundaries of his dominions. These
negotiations took place uncier the Admiuistration of Mr.
Gladstone. Again, ~ ~ n d the
e r Administration of the nobleE a r l opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield) similar negotiations took place in 1875. The Government of India
entirely oonc~ured with the views expressed by theHome Government in those negotiations; and oneof the last despatches I sent home when I mas Viceroy
espressecl the concurrence of the Government of India in thearrangements made by the noble Earl now sitting on thecross benches (the Earl of Derby). It is but fair to the-
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Xussian Government to add that during the time that I was
in India they loyally carried out the engagements into*
which they had entered.
The noble and learned Earl on the woolsack ancl the
noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) have accused
the late Government of tilniclity in their communications with
Russia, and alluded to a paragraph in a despatch of the 310th
of June, 1573, in which the Government of India, when I
was Viceroy, suggested that IIer Majesty's Government
should make a plain declaration to the ltussian Governiuent
that the British Governmellt would defend Afghanistan
in the event of unprovoked attack ; and they have said that
this mas not done. The Government of Inclia always urged
upon Her Majesty's Government, -perhqs in terms a Little
stronger than the Foreign Secretasy of the day may have
liked, the expediency of speaking in the plainest langnage
to the Eussian Government both of the indepenclence of
Afghanistan and of the inconvenience which might arise from
the progress of Russia in the dixection of India. I do not want
to pit the policy of one Government of EIer Najesty against
another; but as that policy has been indiscriminately attacked
by one member of the present Cabinet, I am afxaid I cannot
depend upon other nienlbers of the Cabinet to defend it.
However, in the Centrd Asian Papers lately laid before
Parliament there is a, despatch written by the noble Earl
on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby) to Lord Augustus
Loftus in June, 1877, in which the noble Earl quotes a
despatch from Lord Granville, clsutecl January Yth, 18'74,
and says :" His L0rcls1~i~
thougl~tit right to state ct~lldicllyi~ndat once to
t h e Russian Governniellt, that the indepenclence of Afglianistan was
regarded by Her Mi~jesty's Governlllellt as a matter of great
importance t o the welfare and security of British India, and to the
tranquillity of Asia."

This cleclaration made by Lorcl Granville in 1874, was.
plain and distinct.
The Governme~ltof India in 1874 were much concerned
about some probable movemerlts of the Russians in the.
direction of Nerve, not on account of any qprehension 05
1
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danger to British India, but because of the probability that
:such an advonce would lead to clifficulties between Russia
and Afghanistan ; and at the time when the late Government
.resigned that question was particularly prominent. The
Government of India wrote pressingly to the Home
Government to speak frankly to ltussia, to tell her of the
inconvenience which might arise fro111 that advance, and to
*dowhat was possible to prevent it. The noble Earl who
was then Secretary of State fol. Foreign Affairs (the
Earl of Derby) wrote in the strongest terms to the Russian
Government, and said that the advance of the Russian
.arms in the direction of Merve mould impose on H e r
-Majesty's Government the necessity of making a correspondi n g advance in order to allay apprehensions and to remove
misconception from the minds of the people of those countries.
On reading those words and the worcls used by Lord Gmnqille in 1574, I felt that the intention of the Government of
Jndia had been fully carried out by Her Majesty's Government. It seems to me, therefore, that the inference drawn
1,b.ythe noble and learned Earl on the voolsack and the noble
';Viscount opposite as to the collcluct of Mr. Gladstone's Governlment, and of their 0%-11Gover~~inent,
is entirely unfouncled.
Both Governments, not.ivithstanding the objections of the
!noble and leariled Earl, actually used much the same
.language to Russia as the Government of India, rightly as
I believe, had suggested.
With respect to the opinions of Her Majesty's present
(Government on the position of Russia in Central Asia, i t is
hardly necessary to do more than to refer to the speech of
.the Plime Minister in the House of Coivillons in May, 1576,
,xv11en he said that he was "not of that school who viewed
,the advances of 12ussia into Asia with those deep lnisgivings
aEollie do." I-Ie said that Asia was large enough for the
destinies of both Russia and Englnnd. " At no time,"
lie added, " has there been a better understanding between
the Courts of St. Janles and St. Petersburg than at the present
moment ; and there is this good unclerstnnding because our
l'olicy is a clear and a frank policy." I tllinlr that those
were wise words. They seem, from fhe papers laid before
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80 much for oily policy .with regard to Itussia. Wit11
regard to Afghanistan and other nei@bouring States, thepolicy of the Indian Government was thus espressed by
Lord Mayo, before he died, in a despatch of the 19th ofJanuary, 1872 :“Tile carclind points of the foreign policy wllicll the Governlllent of
India ~11onlJ.steadily pursue m,zy be briefly described as follows :We ahoulcl establish with our frontier St:~tesof Klleht, Afglianistall,
N i l 4 and Burn~ehnad possibly at some future c1;~ywith Yarlrund,
intimate relations of frienclsllip ; we slloulcl ,il,bke tllern feel that
though we are all-pomerful, we hixe 110 ~ ~ i to
s hencroach 011 theis
authority ; but, on tlie contrary, t l n t onr earllest desire is to
support their paver and ma~ntaititheir nationality ; ancl t h a t if severe
necessity arise we might nssist them wit11 nloney, arnis, tind ? =?erhaps,
i n certain eventualities, with nlen. We could thus create m these*
States ontWorks nf our Empire, a11[1 n8s11ring tllenl that t h e ~ 1 : ~of s
annexation are p,~ssed, make thexu 1,rsctic;~llyfeel that tlley llave
everything t o gain and notlling to lose by ccnileavt~urnlgto deserve our
favour and support. "
'

The noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) seemed,
the other night., 1.0 have some difficulty in describing what
our " settled policy " towards Afghanistan ~nvss. If the
noble Viscount had been longer in the Inclia Office he
would have found out that the policy was clear anc?
decidecl. 1 do not want to add anything to the esplanaition
1 h,zve reacl, and I have read it because the policy ought to
stand clearly before your Lordsl~ips. When Lord Mayo was
in Indin the first application that he had to make of that
policy Jvas in dealing with Afghanistan, in consequence of
the arrangements mzlcle by his predecessor, Lord Lanrrence,.
for the support of Shere Ali, and that a meeting should take
place between him and t,lze Viceroy. I am not going over
again the history of the Umnballa meeting. Although Lord
Maiyo, when he met Shere Ali, coulcl not comply with all his
wishes, the result of the conferences which then took placemas by no means unsa;tisfactory. I wish to acld my
tosfimong to the testimony of those noble lorcls who have sai8

ira this House that the personal influence and the generous
confidence inspired by Lord Mayo were of substantial public
advantage in dealing with the Native Princes of Indis,
and almost, if not quite, disarmed the suspicions of one who
race.
was the most susl3icious of a s~~sl~icious
H y Lords, Shere Ali was not less suspi~ious when,
i n the year 1873, I had to enter into some negotiations
with him. 1 will not trouble your Lordships with any
long account of the Simla negotiations, they have been so
much before the House. All that I shall say is that upon
that occasion, having received authority from H e r Majesty's
Government, I gave fihere Ali assurances in respect to
assistance from the British Goverllllleilt under certain
chcunlstances very much in the terms I read just now when
describing the general policy to be pursued towards States
which adjoin British India. There were in the speeches of the
noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) and of the noble and
learned Earl on the woolsack certain statelnents with regard
t o those negotiations which I cannot accept. Of course I
know that the assurances which I g w e to Shere Ali did not
come up to the espectations he entertained. A t the same
tinid, when the noble Viscount brings forward the Prime
she minister of Shere Ali, who conducted the negotiations
i n 1573, as evidence to show that the assurances which I
then gave were vague, I cannot accept the estract read b y
the noble Viscoullt as conveying s correct account of the
views of the Prime Minister. The noble Viscount read an
extract from the conference between the Prime Minister and
Sir Lewis Pelly, on the 8th of February, 1877, which d l be
found at page 204 of the Afghanistan Papers. It is true
that the P i h e Minister then said that the nature of the
assistance to be given to Shere Ali was left obscure, both in
my writings and sayings : but this ren~arkapplied only t o
my f i s t interview with the Prime Minister, and if the
noble Viscount had taken the trouble to read the report of the
nest conference, on the 10th of February, given in the very
nest page of the papers, he would have found that the Prime
Minister proceeded to relate how he had afterwards discussed
the subject completely with the Foreign Secretary, and how
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:at a subse~uentinterview with me " all tlie subjects were
thoroughly discussed, and so nothing was left unconsidered."
T h e Prime Minister, (who, I must say, gave a very accurate
account of the transactions of 1873,) throughout the conferences with Sir Lewis Pelly in 1877, so far from
.complaining that the assurances given by me in 1573 were
vague and undefined, was actually trying t o meet the complaint put into his mouth by Sir Lewis Pelly that they were
vague and inco~lolusive,and that therefore it mas necessary
t o make a new treaty with the Ameer.
There were, no doubt, some causes which led the
Ameer to be dissatisfied with the Government of India. I n
the f i s t place, both he and the Persian Government were
dissatisfied with the arbitration which the British Government 11ad undel-talien, and ~vhichwas ably and impartially
carried out by Sir Frederick Goldemici, to settle the boundary
ofthe two countries in Seistan. Then 8here Ali was offended
.at the advice I gave him to keep faith with his son Yakoob
Khan. I need not defend my conduct in haying done this for
no noble lord has taken esception to it. !Phe noble Viscount
(Viscount Cranbrooli) having been so short a time in office
aannot be espected to know much about these details; but
he entirely misapprehended the facts of the case when he
charged me with having sent the message to the Ameer by s
*' common messenger." My Lords, I sent it by the ordinary
channel of colam~~nicationwith the Ameer-the
Native
Agent of the British Government who was resident at
his Court. That mas, in fact, the only channel of comnlunication I could have employed, and it was precisely
the same channel which was used by Lord Lytton to
conduct the late negotiations with the b e e r . The noble
and learned Earl on the woolsack-and 1 cannot say that I
am surprised at any error into vllich he may have fallen, for
%he subject is very complicated nncl di5cult-has said that
there was a great contrast between my letter and that written
to Shere Ali in regard to his son Yakoob by General
Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General of Turliestan, in
fhe year 1875.
The LORD
CHANCELLOR
: It mas in the year before.
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: I understood the noble
and learned Earl to say 1875; but the letter was written by
General Kaufmann before I vent to India. I n fact, it was
written in 1871, when Lord Mayo was Viceroy, and related to
different events. I feel that I need not dwell long upon the
other ground of coaylaint which the Ameer had against the
Government of India-namely, the sending a Native gentleman to carry a present to the Ruler of TVakhan, who had
been civil to some British officers who had visited his
neighbourhood. There was some misapprehension about this
affair which I esplainecl to the Ameer, but I insisted upon
his permitting the messenger to proceed, as I thought his
objections were unreasonable. The noble Viscount has
commented upon this transaction as if I had been disposed to
go to war with Afghanistan upon the matter; but your
Lordships will readily understand that there mere other
ways of clealing with the Ameer if he had refused ; and, in
fact, he did what I wished.
-1s regards all these sources of complaint on the part of
the Ameer, I apprehend that no noble lord would wish the
Government of Inclia to have done everything which
tlie Ruler of Afghanistan wanted them to do. That mould
have been a course entirely undignified and quite improper.
I hold that the Anleer hacl no reasonable ground of complaint, and I thiulr I clicl what mas right and reasonable
towards him. Let us look, however, at the general result of
this policy, which I have said was the policy of two
Governmeuts, in Irldia and at home, during the whole time
that I Imns Viceroy and also in the time of Lord Mayo.
There was no difference wliatever in the policy of the two
Governments. "0th wanted to give reasonable assurances
of protection to the Ameer, and both desired to Beep on good
terms with him. The result was fairly satisfactory. W e
wished that the Ameer shoulcl keep peace with his neighbours, and that 11e should follow our advice in his foreign
affairs. H e wanted to make an attack on Bokhara, but
he abstained from doing so upon our advice. H e nest
q~~arrelled
with the 'Dersians about Seistan ; nevertheless, in
consequence of our ad1-ice, he accepted our arbitration, and
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as far as I know he loyally kept his word. I advised him to
give no assistance to the Turkomans; he acted upon my aclvice,
and moreover, a t my request, he tried to induce them to give up
to the Russian Government some Russian subjects who hacl
been captured and macle slaves, i n order to prevent a,
quarrd between Russia ancl the Turliomans which might
have brought the Bussians to ~ e r v e ! Then, as to his domestic
affairs, I am not aware .that the Ameer had any serious
quarrel with me about them, with the exception, perhaps,,
n
of m y aclvice to him about Yakoob Khan. H e asked me i
1874to do what I could with the Persian Government to induce
them t o give a civil answer to his letter anno~mcingthe nomination of Abcloola,J a n as his heir. That did not look like the
act of a man who was hostile to the British Government and
The most important thing he
wished to quarrel with it.
did just before I left Inclia was to bring entirely within his
control the country bordering on the Turkoman frontier,
not very far from the boundary which was laid down between
England and Russia as that which was not to be transgressedHe communicated with us. W e wrote home to the Government asking them to inform the Russian Government,
and I believe the noble Earl on the cross benches
(the E a r l of Derby) communicated with Russia. A l l this
shows that ,that was contemplated by the Governments of
Mr. Gladstone and of the noble Earl opposite (the E a r l of
Beaconsfield), namely, to remain on good terms with the
Ruler of Afghanistan and to keep him a reasonable ancl
sensible being who should not quarrel with his neighbq~us,
was maintained up to the time when I left India. I d o not
like to quote my ovn clespatches, but the account I gave in
them of the state of mincl of the Ameer was very much like that
which I have now given to y o n ~ordshi~2s.l
I beliew nownot on my own authority, but on that of everybocly who
knew anything about it-that the Ameer was then loyal,
i n the sense that he had not the slightest inclination to
turn to Russia for s~1ppol-t. On the other hmd, he was a
little "touchy" on certain things! Ontwo occasions the Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State when I was
Viceroy that if he wo~11dtreat him with patience, a n d not

press upon him certain things unnecessarily which were
distasteful to him, there was no doubt that he would
remain our good friend. We felt that he was an Asiatic,
and should be treated with patience as such by his European
neighbours.
I know the noble Marquis opposite (Salisbury) entertains
a different opinion from that which I hold, in comlnon with
everyone with whom I have conversed who has filled a
responsible position in India, upon the disposition cf She~.eAli.
'The nobie Marquis, of course, has a perfect right to his o m
opinion, but he ought not to cast a slur upon a distinguished
servant of the Government of India which is entirely
andeserved. I n a despatch of October 4th, 1877, the noble
Marquis, referring to the state of mind of the Ameer when1
left Inclia in 1876, said :" This (the course of events) demonstrates but too plainly how
erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as 1875 by Sir R.
Polloclr, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that ' no unfavouriible change
hacl occurred in the disposition of the Ameer.' Shere Ali's co~lfidential:
Envoy stated explicitly that his inaster liad 'now a deep-rooted mistrust
of the good faith and sincerity of the British Qovenlmcnt.' "

Sir R. Pollock tells me 11e is unable t o correct this statement himself, because he has very properly felt it to be his
duty, in consequence of the confidential position he so recently
occupied at Peshawur, to consider his lips sealed, and to take
no part directly or indirectly in the discussions that have
taken place about the Afghan war. My Lords, the opinion
given by Sir R. Polloh was quoted by the noble Marquis
from the despatch of the Government of India of the 7th of
June, 1875, ancl it was given, not in 1875, but in the
beginning of 1874, and therefore before the incidents about
Yakoob Ehan and the despatch of a messenger to Wnkhan
had occurred. But, besides, your Lordships will see in s
moment how unfair the statement of the noble Marquis is
with respect to Sir R. Pollock. It is perfectly true that
Shere Ali's Prime Minister said to Dr. Bellew in n lx-ivnte
conversation on the 28th of Janua~*y,
1877, ~vliicl~
will be
found at page 196 of the Afghanistan l'apers, that "tlie Amcer
had a deep-rooted mistrust of the British Government, an4
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that he had many reasons for that distrust," bLztit appears
from that ~~nversation
that the 111ain reason for that
mistrust was the endeavour to force British officers upon
him. No doubt the Prime Millister alluded to other
matters, but this was, all through the conferences, the
principal ground. of his complaints ; and therefore-I am
sure perfectly unintentionally-the noble Ila3[arquis mns in
error in attributing any mistake to Sir Ricl~ardPollock.
I regret that the noble Marquis should have thrown
any doubts upon Syud Boor Mallomed's character
by saying that his statements were obviously insincere.
I t is true that his history isliie a cllapter froin the " k a b i a n
Nights." He travelled once with a string of horses from
'one end of India to the other, and eventnally rose to be the
trusted Minister of the Ameer, and serred his master ably
and loyally. A further statement was mncle by him,
as will be seen by the papers, when he was lying
ill. Dr. BelIew went to see him and the statement
he then made mas very pathetic. H e said, " This is
a very serious business. It is the last time the Ameer
will treat vith the British Government. You must
not impose upon us a burden which mre cannot bear, and if
you overload us the responsibility rests with you." The doctor
asked him what burden he referred to, an4 he replied, " The
residence of British officerson the frontiers of Afghanistan."
This, my Lords, is enough t o show $hat the state of the
Ameer7s nlij.d as represented by his 71-inle Minister
arose mainly from the endeavour to force resident British
officers upon him, directed by the noble Marq~~is
himself
in 1876, contra~yto the opinion of Sir R. PoJlocli and
to that of every officer who had a knomledge of
Afghanistan.
I said that when I left India the Ameer was loyal to
the British Government. Whether he was inclined to turn
tomacis Russia is the main point. I t was said by the noble
Viscount (Viscount Cranbroolr) that after the negotiations of
1873 the Ameer at once turned t o Russia. What proof is
there for that statement ? I mas sml.prisedto hear the opinion
of our Native Agent at Cabd quoted in support of it, and

at the nianner in which the noble Viscount spoke of
the reports of the Natire Agent. The noble Viscount said
it v a s easy to see that his reports were all rubbish. Our
Native Agent was a Mohammedan gentleman of high
character and stancling, Nawab Atta Mahomecl Khan, who
did good service in the Nutiny, and received a ha~dsome
reward from Lorcl Lytton for his services at Cabnl.
Englishnzen are not the only people who can clo anything.
Many Natives can ancl do render goocl service to the
British Government. In October, 18TG, OLT Native
Agent went to Simla and saicl that the Ameer clid not
suspect us of conspiring with Russia to his prejudice, nor
that the British covetecl any pcrtion of his territory; the
Ameer was well aware, he saicl, that Russia sooner or later
woulcl attack Afghanistan. The Agents of Russia, he aclded,
were regarded by the Ameer as a source of embarrassment,
That statement was made at a formal interview, and in a
private interview with Captain Grey he said "that the
Ameer nras clesirous of sectwing a pied d fe~*?.oin British
territory vhither to send his family ancl property when lie
cleared for action with Russia." I s it possible in the face
of those statements to eay that a t that time he was unfriendly
to England ancl friendly to Russia ?
The noble Earl on the woolsack-who, by the way,
in commenting upon the letters of Shere Ali to General
Kaufmann, although he is doubtless accnstomecl, as he said,
to interpret English clocuments, stl.angely rnisinterpretecl the
value of the ordinary terms of comlsliment enlployecl in the
East-after giving an accowt of the negotiations of 1573,
t~uneclround and asked -whether any of your Lordship
would have refused to p a n t what was then asked by Shere
Ali ancl refused by me. I have aiain to come between one
member of the present Aclministration ancl another, and t o
say that in his remarks acldressed to me the noble and
learned Earl was at the same time conclemning L'IS
I 011
Government. I had the honour of serving as Viceroy for
two years under the Administration of the lloblc Earl
opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield). w h a t lhapl~ened i n
1874 ? There was a debate in your Lorclsllips' House in
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which the subject of the negotiations of 1573vas thorougllIy
discussecl; and what was then the opinion of the present
Government ? The opinion of the Government, as expressed
in that debate, was that it was q ~ ~impossible
t e
to give Shere
Ali what he wanted-namely, an ~nlconditionalguarantee of
protection. B L I ~is that all ? I servecl as Viceroy for t ~ v o
years after that, and did I receive any instructions to give
Shere Ali the ~~nconditional
g~laranteehe wantecl 2 Not one
single despatch ; not one single expression ; not one singIe
hint to that effect. 'cIlere," saicl the noble Visconnt
(Cranbrook), "is what ought to have been clone-tile
guwantee ought to have been given," and the noble Earl
says that this was the thing that drove the Anleer into the
arms of Eussia. But look at the two deslsatches in which
the mble Marq~rlsopposite (galisbury) instr~zctedme in lS75
t o obtain the admission of British Residents into Afghanistan.
I s there a single word about giving additional assurances
t o the Ameer ? Not a worcl ; no suggestion wl~atevelwas made that any greater assLwances of support should
be given to him than I had given in 1873. So ~ L X C I I
so that I mas obligecl to reniincl the noble M a r q ~ ~ that
i s if
Shere Ali entertained the proposal, he would be certain to ask
for some retun. Therefore, I say that the charges brought
against me by noble Lords opposite are really charges
against the Goveimnent of which they themseivzs are
members. There can, i n fact, be no distinction &awn in
this matter between the present and the late Government.
I do not accuse the Government of doing anything
wrong in the matter, for I do not beLiere any Government mould do such a thing as to give Shere Mi a n
~~nconclitional
guarantee of protection-arias, ammunition,
troops, whatever he liked-without asking for anything in
return. This is what he asked; ancl this is what it is now
saicl by the noble Earl on the woolsa~kthat I ought to have
given him.
!-I. have shown that cl~wingthese eight years there had
been no change of policy. The objects of the Governments
in India and at home were the same ; we all wanted
the friendship of Afghanistan; our difference mns as to

the means of sec~vingit. In 1576 I received a despatoh from
the noble Marquis pointing out the desirability of our having
it British Resideat at Herat. I should have liked to have
had on that frontier a British officer. I was not against
the measure. Do not suppose I had the least desire
to oppose it ; but I thonght it well to consult the officers of
the Government who knew most about the matter. I was on
the point of proceeding t o Delhi. When I arrived there I
consulted the Lieutenant-Governor of the PunjBb, and all t h e
most experienced officers of the frontier. I also s ~ m m o n e d
two Native gentlemen of high character, who had been t h e
Agents of the Gorernlnent of Inciia at CCsul, and who I i n y
the h u e e r vell: one of them was the Nawab Gholam
Hussein Khan. I did not hold a, formal conference, but I
saw all thase officers privately-one at a time-and aslied
them how the request ~ v o ~be
~ l likely
d
to be entertained by
Shere Ali, and mhat woulcl be the best may of making it.
They saicl that the admission of British Residents into
Afghanistan vas the one thing which the b e e r disliked
more than another, and which was most likely to get
x s into trouble with him, and I nlade them write
down their opinions that I might send them home.
After that I had all the papers on the subject looked out
and examined to see if there was any information which
would warrant us in assuming that Shere Ali would receive
a British Agent at Herat. The noble Narquis Tpas under
that impression. H e m o t e to the Government of India
that '' the Ameer has more than once in former years
exl)ressecl his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent
at Herat, ancl it is therefore not possible that, if his
intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty
now." I was under the impression myself that at some time
h e might have said something to that effect. W e found that
Lord Mayo, at Umballa, had distinctly told the Ameer that
he would not be asked to receive British officers in Afghanistan ; but we thought that he might have said something in
private conversations to the effect that he might accept them
elsewliere than at Cabnl. W e wrote this to the Secretary
of State, adding that what might have passed then co~dcl
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not fairly be used in any negotiations with the Ameer.
B u t since we examined into this matter in 1875,
it has been set at rest by the evidence of Mr. Seton
g a r r , who was Foreign Secretary to Lord Mayo at Umballa,
and was therefore completely acquainted with all that
took place. Mr. Seton Karr came to me of his own accord
the other day and sdd-'LI want to tell you that it is quite
mistake to suppose that anything of the liind was ever said
by the Ameer." Not only is Ms. Seton Earr's recollection
clear on the point that Shere Ali never expressed his willingness to receive British officers in Afghanistan, but he gave
a n account of what occurred in a letter to Lord Lawrence,
written on the 5th of April, 1869, immediately after the
conferences at Umballa; which he has authorised Ee to use,
and which contains the following passage :-" He " (Shere
d l i ) "is told that we don't want British officers as Besiclents
at Cab~dor anywhere else, and he says they would clo him
harm in the eyes of his people." Lord Mayo's official
account of what took place has been strangely misinterpreted.
It has even been said that the mission of British officers to
Afghanistan was a boon which he denied ,to Shere Ali.
This, however, is an error which is refuted by a private letter
written on the 3rd of June, 1869, by Lord Mayo to the Duke
of Argyll, in which Lord Mayo, summing up the UmbaIla
conferences, wrote "the only pledges given were that we
would not interfere in his affairs ; that we would support his
independence ; that we would not force European ofEcers as
Residents upon him against his nish."
I n June, 1875,the Government of India gave their opinion
that it would not be wise to force British Residents on the
Ameer. We thought it might lead to trouble, and, as servaots
of the Government, we thought it our duty to point that out.
There vas no hurry about the matter ; and having been told
by every oae whose opinion was of any valuejthat the course
proposed was likely to alienate the Ameer, we stated our
opinion to the Government; but the Government, notmithstanding the unanimous opinion of the Viceroy and his
Council, replied that the course they had suggested must be
followed. Again the Government of India, in January,

1876, pointed out the evil effects which in their opinion
would follow from carrying out the instructions of the noble
Marquis. in the hope that the matter might still be reconsidered by Her Majesty's Government.
I n February, 1876, however, Lord Lytton, before leaving
England, receivecl distinct and positive instructions, both
written and verbal, to insist that Shere Ali should receive
British Residents in Afghanistan. My Lords, I do not
wish to say a word against the proceedings of Lord Lytton ;
I know the clif3culties and responsibilities of a Viceroy, and
Lord Lytton seems to me to have carniecl out the instruotions
which hc received. h he responsibility rests, not upon him,
but upon Her Majesty's Government. And here it is
necessary to remember that there was no change of circumstances which made it necessary then to alter our relations
with Afghanistan, for, as I have already shown to your
Lordships, the Prime Minister declared in May, 1876, in
&heHouse of Commons, that the relations between Great
Britain and Russia had never been more satisfactory.
The first step that was taken in India was to request Shere
Ali to receive Sir Lewis Pelly at Cabul. On his declining to do
so he was warned in July, 1876, that if he persisted he would
isolate himself from the alliance and support of the British
Government. Ny Lords, I consider that this was the
turning point of the negotiations with the Ameer, and we
know that three members of the Viceroy's Council, 8ir
Henry Xorman, Sir Arthur Hobhonse, and Sir William
Muir, dissented from the course which was then followed.
As some exception has been taken to their conduct in making
thek dissent known, I must explain to your Lordships that
the Government of India is not a government by a Viceroy,
but by a Viceroy in Counoil; that ordinary matters are
determined by the majority, and it is only in regard to
matters essentially concerning the interests of India
that the Viceroy has the power by law to overrule
the majority. By statutory rules, framed by the
Viceroy in Council under the Government of India Act,
Members of Council have a right to express their dissent from
any act done by the Government of India. These three
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Members of Council expressed their dissent at the time. The
Viceroy requested them to postpone the formal record of their
dissent until a despatch was sent home reporting the prooeeclings ; but for some reason or other no despatch was sent
home for a great length of time, indeed until May, 1877,
when dl three had left India. I do not blame Lord Lytton
llis reasons;
for cletaining the despatch, for I do not
and I must add that I do not think it vas done for the
purpose of preventing the dissents from being recorded.
Lord Lytton is an exceedingly able miter, and neecl
not be afraid of answering any objection that might be
raised by Members of his Council. But whatever the
reason may have been, it is totally contrary to the
practice that the course of important affairs sho~11d not
be frequently reported to the Home Government. AS
those Members of Council were debarrecl from the usual
opportunity of recording their dissent from the course
taken in July, 1876, I have no hesitation in expressing my
opinion that when the despatch of the Government of India
of the 10th of May, 1877, was made public, they were fully
justified in also making public their dissent. If they had
not clone so it must have been supposed that they were
oonsenting parties to the policy describecl in the despatch as
having been p~srsuedby the Government of India when they
were members of that Government, and responsible for its
action.
To return to the negotiations with Shere Ali. ' The next
important step followed in October, 1876, when the b e e r
was plainly told that if he did not receive British officers
i n his territories he woulcl lose all the protection he
hacl hitherto obtained from England. A t one time it was
thought fie wo~ildnot give way ;but owing to helplessness "
he said he must agree to the demands of the British
Government. H e said, in substance,-Let my Envoy meet
Sir Lewis Pelly, explain my difficulties, and if after this the
Viceroy will not give way, I must.
M y Lords, I should like to dwell somewhat upon the
oonferences at Peshamv, but time forbids it. I have no
fault to fincI with the lnanner in which Sir Lewis Pelly
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carried out the instructions which he had received; he
certainly carried them out with great determination. H e
began by telling the Prime Minister that the Viceroy deshed
to remove some misapprehensions in the mind of the Ameer.
The Prime Minister replied that the Ameer had none ; and
when he was told that these misapprehensions had arisen out
of the conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa, and the communications with Lord Northbrooli in 1873, the Envoy said
that the Ameer went away from Umballa perfectly satisfiecl,
and that the communications with Lord Northbrooli in 1573
were satisfactory also. %%.at weighed most in the b e e r ' s
mind, he said, was the policy of the present Viceroy,
which was different from that of previous Viceroys, in
forcing the Ameer to receive British officers as Residents
in Afghanistan, contmsy to the Treaty of 1867 with Dosk
Mahomed, and to all the '' agreements," " wsitings," anct
" assurances " he had received from Lord Lawrence, Lord
Mayo, and myself. The conference concluded by Sir Lewis
Pelly, at the Prime Minister's request, submitting his objections for the consideration of the Viceroy. Sir Lewis Pelly
was then instructed to demand a distinct and prompt answer
whether or no the Ameer refused to receive British officers
i n any part of Afghanistan. On this point, however, no
answer was ever given in consequence of the death of the
Prime Minister. It is a very extraordinary thing that no
explanation has been given why this demand was not pressed
further, for it mas clear that the object of the British
Government was to place British Residents in Afghanistan ;
and there is reason to believe that under great pressure, and
under great apprehensions, the Ameer would have given
way. Indeed, it appears i5om the despatch of the Government of India of the 10th of May, 1877, that Lord Lytton
h e w that another Envoy was on his way from Cabul, who was
reported to have " authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government." Sir Lewis Felly was
nevertheless instructed, on the 30th of March, to close the
conference at once.
.f Something has been said of the conduct of the Ameer
at that time as justifying the close of the negotiations. It
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Deer mo~dclhave given
lesgatch of the Govern377, that Lord Lytton
a y horn Cabul, who was
eventuany a n the conSir Lewis P e l l y was
f Mwc~, to close the
onduct of the Ameel*
the negotiations.
It

seem@ that he had been raising the cry of "jehad,"'
or of a religious war, and using hostile language towards.
the British Government. My Lords, I am not going to
defend this s~~spicious
Ameer, for I think he behaved very
foolishly throughout these transactions. But it is only fair to
look at the ciirc~mstancesunder which he was then placed.
The occupation of Quetta occurred in Octobe~,1576, just at
the time when the Ameer was most frightened at the menacing language of the British Government. Prepmations were
made about the same time at Rawul Yindee to assemble a
force ; a bridge was thrown across the Lndus, and I believe that
arrangements weye actually made to send a column 11p to
the ICurram Valley, which is on the direct route to Cabnl.
Besides this, the Viceroy had recently seen the Maharaja
of Cashmere and encouraged him to advance against some
territory on the North-East of Afghanistan, over which Shere
Ali claimed sovereignty. Xothing is said about all this in
the papers laid before Parliament, but there is no doribt
about the facts. They have been stated in Pa~li~ament
without contmcliction. The truth seems to me to be that the
poor b e e r coxild not form any other conclusion than that the
British Government were on the poillt of attacliing him, stnd i
he turned to every side to see what defence he co~dilclmake.
H e found, however, that the ~eoplearound him did not wish
to quarrel with the British Government, and we are told by
the Government of India that the whole movement had
" completely collapsed" before the close of the Peshawx
Conference.
,'The conference was closed in Karch, 1877. When the
Viceroy closed the conference he took away from the
Ameer ewry assurance that he hacl received of .protection and support from Lord Lm~ence, Lord Mayo,.
and myself, either for himself or for his dynasty.
H e withchew our Native Agent from Cabul, and therefore
deprived the Ameer of the means of communicating
with the British Government ; and perhaps the noble Narcpis
opposite mill explain
door was then left open to the
Ameer. Neither the noble Viscount (Viscount Crankrook)
nor the noble Earl on the woolsack have allndecl to the real

result of the Pesbamr conferences, and the noble Viscount
described the position of affairs most inadequately in his
despatch of the 28th of November last, by saying that we had
assuulled towards the Ameer a position of '' vigilant reserve."
X y Lords, these were the circuillstances of the case. I think
the course pursued mas not wise. When the Gavel-nment
found that the Ameer was not willing to receive British
Residents in Afghanistan, they need not have altogether
broken off from him, or have led him to feel that
he had nothing to expect from the British Govelmment.
I f a different course had been taken, and time had been
given him, his feelings mere such that he would, I believe,
in the end have accepted their terms, however hard he
might have thought them to be.
Than came a time of real difficudky, when it was necessary
that closer relations should be maintained with Afghanistan.
That necessity arose on account of the political oonclition of
Europe, England and Russia having been graclually brought
t o the verge of vw. It would then have been right to have
strengthened our relations with the Ameer, but in what
position hacl Hey Majesty's Government then placed this
country with reference to Afghanistan ? By lmshing forward
clemnnds which were not necessary, contrary to d l Indian
advice: when there esisted no crisis whatever, they had so
alienated the b e e r that it would hare been ~ l m o s t
humiliating then to have made any advances towards
him. The Secretary of State (Viscount Oranbrook)
used an expression in regard to the state of things in 1973
which is far more applicable to the policy of 1876, namely, that
" it was too late."
The policy of Her Majesty's Government
made it "too late" to make a friend of the Ameer
not
when it was really wanted. I t may be said that I o~xgl~t
to content myself with offering criticisms on the conclnct of
the Government, but should indicate what I think ought
.to have been done. I say that if the Ameer hacl not been
frightened about the reception of British Residents in
Afghanistan, the moment there was a probability
of a war between Russia 2nd England the Viceroy
#ought to have eomuu~nicatecl with him, arranged for
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,z meeting, ancl offered to enter into an agreement -7ith hinz
similar to that entered into with his father in 1557. I
satisfied that he wolfid have reacEly accepted sllch an offer.
T h e policy of the Government, however, prevented that being
done, ancl this, I believe, was one of the maJn causes of the
m-ar.
Then came the last stage of these transactions. The
Ameer was alienate$ from us, he had no hope of sul,port
from us, he had no Native Agent of ours at his COLU~.
j-t
TVaS arranged at Simla in 1873, that if he were aekecl to
receive a Russian Mission he sho~llclat once cons~dtthe
Government of India ; but this ~vasimpossible as our ru'ntit-e
Agent had been mitbdrawn. The ~ & e rhad been told that
we clicl not care either about him or his dynasty. When,
therefore, the Russian Mission was pressed upon him, as he
co~~lcl
look for no protection from us, he had no alternative
but to accept it, and it seems that he clicl so ~~nwillingl~.
When this mas first known, it appears to me thnt the
Government of India rightly intimated to Her Majesty's
Gove~nmeotin their telegram of the 30th of July thnt the
matter was one which ought to be settlecl betveen the
British and Russian Governments, and not between the
British Government and Afghanistan. When England and
Russia were on the verge of mr it is true that neither
country could fairly be held to be bound by the anangea e n t s of 18'73 or 1875 in regard to Central Asia. But
before the Rrnssian Mission reachecl Cabd the Treaty of
Berlin hacl beer. signed, md I agree mith the noble Earl on
the cross benckes (Earl of Derby) that the Government should
have clealt with Russia and not mith Afghanistan. I
believe, moreover, that they migllC have come to a peaceful
ancl satisfactory understanding with Rnssia, and ha-ie
avoided the present war. Russia was asked, no doubt, to
aithchaw tbE Ehission from Cab111 ; but I ms~uprisedat the
satisfaction expressed by the noble Earl on the woolsack at
tile cnswer received to that demand. In fact, having recei~ed
no satisfactory answer from Russia, Her Majesty's GOT-ernmerit went to war with Afghmistan. 1
not d ~ e i ion
the circlunstnnces connected with the denpatch of Sir xevilb

@haml~eflain'sXission, because from the beginning I can
only regard it as a declaration of war.
X y Lords, I have trespassed so long npon your ind~zlgence
that I shall say no lllore escepting that I believe this war
v a s unnecessary, and that vith the esercise of a little
common prudence on the part of Her Majesty's Government
it might have been avoided. No advantage, I an1 con~-inced,
can result from it, either to England or to India ; and holcling
these 6.ews I feel myself reluetnlltly obliged to vote for the
alllendnlent proposed by lily noble friend behind me.
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curtain has fallen on the secdnd Afghan Far almost as suddenly
as rose, and the public-in so far as i t is represented by the London
Press and the London world-seems almost ashamed at baving been
1 deluded into taking an interest i n so small and ephemeral a matter.
A reaction of this nature is perhaps the natural consequence of the
I exaggerated tone which was taken a t the outset by the opponents of
t h e war, in regard to its character and the risks that it involved.
The late Lord Sandhurst, it is well known, aBirmed a few years back
t h a t it would not be safe to adrance on Candahar with a less force than
30,000 men, and the expense of such an enterprise was popularly estimated a t twenty millions of money. We mere told, indeed, that our
so-called ' Jingoism in the East ' would inevitably lead either to
national disaster or national bankruptcy ; and now, because these
sinister predictions have not been realised, but, on the contrary, a
short, inexpensive, and not inglorious campaign, skilfully conducted
and bravely supported, has been crowned xith a peace promising
substantial political results, Re are taunted with having made a
mountain of a molehill, with having raised a hobgoblin for the mere
purpose of laying it, and, i n fact, with having betrayed the nation
i n t o a needless and unseemly exhibition of alarm.
I cannot take blame to myself for having fallen into either of these
: wo errors of exaggeration. P certainly never gave any countenance,
In t h e one hand, to the supposed military difficulties of invading
, Qfghanistan : on the contrary, I almays anticipated that at Candahar
, -e
be received as liberators by the great majority of the p o p ;tion, and I further stated my conviction that the Afghans were
.: ,jut feeble enemies in the field, so feeble, indeed, that a small veil' appointed British force might march triumphantly from one end of
, the country to the other ; but on the other hand, I believed then-as
! ' believe now-that India mas last year threatened with a real and
: ;-,rmidable danger, which required to be met with an earnest and
%.
,,ilful frontage of defence ; and I may add that i n my opinion this
1 anger, although averted at the time by the fearless attitude
i.
jgorous
measures of the Viceroy, and thrown still further
5-~Vir
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background by the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak, may
any moment revive if our vigilance relax, or if, under the influec
of party feeling, our recent political action i n Asia should by so
futllre Government be reversed.

It is important that we should realise to ourselves the nature
extent of the danger whicli threatened us, if we would appreciate
true value of our line of defence, and I address myself therefor
the fist instance to this consideration. I f the Berlin Conference
fallen through in the summer of last year-and for weeks, it mus
remembered, the issue trembled in the balance-it is almost certain
there would have been a Russian military occupation of Afghanist
support of Shir Ali's authority, Kavfmann's force, which had adv
t o Jam, being thrown across the Oxus upon Herat, while an au
column strengthened the Afghan position a t Cabul ; and we
have been thus committed to a n immediate conflict with ou
European rival on the Indus as well as on the Bosphorus. W
Treaty of Berlin, however, was signed on the 13th of July, the
programme underwent a considerable modification, and the
upon our Indian frontier assumed a different form.
paration for direct hostility, the Russian object was now shifte
acquisition of a dominant position at the Court of Cabul, from whence
a friendly communication might be kept up with the neig
Indian States, and a preliminary skirmishing array of intrigue an
agitation might be directed against the Indian border. The mai
feature of the new line of attack was, of conrse, the establis
Stolitoff's mission a t Cabul; but there were many subsidiar
tions of hardly less importance-preparations, indeed, which, as t h i Y
proved abortive, have not hitherto received much
which, if they had been unchecked by our invasion, might
developed into very serious causes of annoyance. What may
the precise conditions of the proposed Russo-Afghan alliance
transpired, though no doubt the confidential' corresponden
Kaufmann and Shir Ali which preceded StolitoFs mission
been placed in the Viceroy's hands by Yaciib Khan ; b
go far wrong i n assuming that the Russian treaty
mutatis mutamdis, would have been very much the sam
that is, it would have provided for the exclusive Russian
Afghan relations with foreign Governments, exactly as we have provided in a contrary sense for retaining that control i n our own hands.
A further light is thrown on the aggressive policy of
proceedings at other points of the Afghan frontier ~ i m u l
her diplomatic venture at Cabul. She seems for a lon
have !+casta, covetous and curious eye on the passes leading idow
direct upon India from the Upper Oxus valley, judging-and judgin
truly-that a post near these passes, either a t Sarik-kul, or Siphad
Vakhzin, or even a t Panjah, would not only protect and consolidate
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h e r recent acquisition of territory on the Pamir plateau, but would
also serve as a most convenient position for pushing her further
reconnaissance to the south. From such a point, indeed, in one
direction, she might communicate with Cashmir through Yassin
a n d Gilgit, and in another with the semi-independent States north
of the Cabul river, through Mastfij and Chitr%l. During last
autumn Russia thus launched three tentative expeditions upon the
region i n question under the guise of geographical exploration. The first expedition led by M. dshanin, after successfully
pushing on along the old Mohammedan road from Hissar to Rasht,
a n d tracing the Surkhkb through Karategin to the junction of the
M u k river, Tvas unable to force its way from the glacier-fed
sources of this stream over the heights of the Trans-Alai range to
P a m i r , and the spirited leader of the party was unable, therefore, to
realise his hope ' of writing his next letter from Sarik-kul or Darkut,'
t h e latter name applying to the famous pass on the Cashmir frontier
where ]poor Hayward was murdered some fifteen years ago. The
second party, led by 3f. Severtsoff, which had been originally
detailed for service with the eastern column of the Afghan expeditionary force commanded by Abramoff, approached nearer to the
promised land at the sources of the Oxus, having crossed the Pamir
from north to south by the lakes Rara-kdl, Rang-kdl, and Yeshilkfil to the immediate vicinity of the Shignzin villages, so as to leave
n o t more than twenty or thirty miles of unvisited country, along the
banks of the Aksu or Morghhb river, between the respective limits of
English and Russian survey. The political importance of this last
exploration is considerable ; for Russia appears to extend the elastic
frontiers of her Kokand dependencies in harmony with the advance of
h e r surveying parties to the south, and she may thus cIaim to have
n o w annexed the whole of the Alichdr Pamir, instead of stopping
short at the Aksu or Morghgb rivex, which, being a longer and larger
stream than the Panj, is regarded by geographers as the true Oxus,
forming, under the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1872, the northern
boundary of the Afghan territory.' Severtsoffs orders appear to have
b e e n to carry his survey up to Victoria Lake, and beyond into the
Vakh6n alley, which would have brought him within hail of the
coveted passes ; but a failure of provisions compelled him to return
from the Shignhn border. A more direct attempt to open up relations
w i t h the tribes witbin the great range, and who have always been
Inore or less connected with India, was made by Colonel Matveyef,
who, accompanied by an astronomer and topographer, actually penetrated, in September last, to Fyzabad, the capital of BadakhshQ,
a n d , in virtue of the Russian alliance with Shir Ali, claimed
from the Afghan governor escorts and introdnctions to the chiefs of
1
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to the influential position already secured by Major Biddullph
in the mountains, as to the suspicions of the Badakhshani ruler,
rnho not unnaturally mistrusted his scientific visitor : otherwise
a basis of Russian intrigue might hare been established a t Mastfij,
which mould have demoralised the tribe chiefs of DardistBn,
as far as the frontiers of Peshawer. At the same time Russia,
taking advantage of Shir Ali's friendlilless, despatched an officer,
Captain Bykoff, to survey the Oxus from the junction of the Surkhlib
[or Yakhsh) to Petro-Alesandrofsk, with a view to determine the
fitness of the great river for steam navigation. This survey was
eminently successful. The Oxus vas provecl. to be navigable as high
up as the frontier of Badakhshgn, and though up to the present time
there is only one vessel, the ' Samarcand,' employed in the navigation,
and, omiag t o difficulties about the supply of fuel, she has not ascended
higher than Ichoja-Saleh, where the Afghan territory commences, i t
may be taken for granted that before long a steam flotilla will be established on the river, to the great advantage of commerce and with the
certain effect of impressing deeply both Afghans and Uzbegs with the
power and resources of the Russian Government. The most significant
step, however, that was taken by Russia during this halcyon period of
her relations with Cabul was to employ Colonel Grodekoff, an accomplished officer of the Etat-Major, to survey the route from the Osus
to Herat along the line by Sir-i-pG1 and Mymeneh, which leads
direct from the Russian head-quarters at Samarcand. Colonel Grodekoff, having accomplished this duty in a very masterly manner,
continued his reconnaissance through KhorassBn to the Caspian, and
lzas now, it is said, joined the staff of the Turcoman army, in order to
give General Lazareff the benefit of his experience on the advance of
the Russian troops towards the great centre of interest a t Herat.
From these several indications there car1 be little doubt, I think,
but that Russia, although restrained from active hostility against
England by the European pacification guaranteed under the Treaty
of Berlin, did nevertheless, in disregard of the spirit of that Treaty,
contemplate a continued adverse pressure upon India through the
establishment of a strong political influence in the countries to the
south of the Oxus ; Herat, Cabul, and Badakhshgn being the positions
to which her attention was especially directed as the most favourable
stand-points for maintaining and directing an insurrectionary propagandisrn. A certain diplomatic reticence has been observed-and
very properly-in all our Ministerial declarations, as to how far the
Afghan war was precipitated by the proceedings of Russia, or to
wbat extent it aimed at counteracting her policy. The indignities
and injuries which we had sustained at the hands of Shir Ali,
together with the necessity of rectifying our 'haphazard' frontier
a l o ~ gthe Indus valley, were put forward as the ostensible causes of
the war. With the exception, indeed, of two notable instances
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Najor Biddulph
of plain speaking-first, the famous declaration of Lord Lrtton, in
the Badakhshkni ruler,
the Simla manifesto of 1878, that 'the British Government would
ltific visitor : othervise
not tolerate interference on the part of any other Power in the inQ established at *,tq,
ternal affairs of Afghanistan ; ' and, secondly, Lord Salisbury's catele chiefs of DardistiU, gorical demand for the withdrawal of Stolitoff's missioc from the
the same time R u s h ,
Court of the Amir, as at variance with the repeated pledges given
3: despatched an officer,
by Russia that Cabul was beyond the scope of her political actionjunction of the Surk&b
there has really been nothing to draw public attention to the imporvie^ to dcte~minethe
tance of the Russian factor in our dealings with the Afghan question ;
ittion. This survey nlss
and yet in reality that factor was the essential element of the whole
to be navigable as high 1 transaction. It was especially to counteract Russian influence that
1' 1 up t o the present time i we originally embarked in the mar, and-which is still more to the
played in the navigation,
point-it is the third article of the Treaty of Gandamak, binding the
fuel, she has not ascended i Amir to conduct all his foreign relations in accordance with the ad1 territory commences, it 3, vice and vishes of the British. Government, which constitutes the
team ffotilla will be estatouchstone of our present success and gives us our best assurance of
commerce and with the
security in the future. On the satisfactory nature of the general /
ms and Uzbegs with the
principles involved in the treaty there cannot be two opinions. It
~ t . The most significant
is just the sort of agreement that we might have required Uost Mang this halcyon period of
homed Khan to sign when we gave him back his country in 1842lel Grodekoff, an accomwith the solitary exception, perhaps, of the clause relating t o a perthe route from the Osus
manent British Resident at Cabul-and which, at any period from
Mymeneh, which leads
that time to the present, would have fulflled all our legitimate ex[arcand. Colonel Gradepectations in regard to the Afghan alliance.' Our main object has
very masterly manner,
ever been, since the date of Lord Auckland's famous Simla Manifesto
.ss5n to the Caspian, and
of 1838, to obtain the establishment of ' a strong friendly and inrcoman army, in order to
dependent power' on the north-western frontier of India, without,
rience on the advance of
however, accepting any crushing Liabilities in return ; and this is
~f interest at Herat.
what seems to have now for the first time been placed within our
be little doubt, I think,
grasp by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak. This treaty,
active hostility against
indeed, is not more remarkable for what it specifies than for what it
anteed under the Treaty
omits ; for while the third article disposes once for all of the Russian
le spirit of that Treaty,
pretensions and at the same time guarantees the Cabul State against
upon India through the
foreign pressure or aggression-a responsibility which, although not
e in the co~mtriesto the
previously formalised, must in reality always have attached to uslsh&nbeing the positions
i t carefully avoids that much more embarrassing obligation of a per.d as the most favourable
sonal or dynastic guarantee against domestic enemies. In presence
an inslmectionary proof a danger which menaces the safety of India we are content to
has been observed-and
~ view
t
of the vicissitndes
pledge the resources of the Empire, b ~ in
&ions, as to how far the
of civil warfare which do not immediately concern us, whether reedings of Russia, or to
sulting from misgovernment, or faction, or family competition, we
policy, The indignities
retain a perfect liberty of action, according to the exigencies of the
the hands of Shir Ali,
time. It is probable that Major Caragnari had to enco~~nter
some
ur ' haphazard ' frontier
importunity on this latter point, for i n the many-headed family of
the ostensible causes of
Payendeh Khan there will always be pretenders discontented with
tmo notable instances
their lot and ready, if the occasion offered, to strike in for power ;
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and against such disturbers of the peace a British guarantee would
have been a most acceptable security : but Yaciib Khan was no
doubt early disabused of any expectations he may have formed on
this head. It was probably pointed out to him that, fortified with
the prestige of a British alliance, and commanding through the
subsidy the best means of acquiring popular support, lle was placed
in a position immeasurably superior to all competitors, while there
was t h e further obvious argument in his favour, that, so long as he
was competent to govern and loyal in his relations t o his ally, i t
must be to our interest to strengthen his position so as to enable
him t o put down disorder or disaffection upon the frontier. But
whatever may have been the exact scope of the discussions which
passed between Cavagnari and Yac6b Khan a t Gandamak, it is at any
rate a matter of congratulation that we have escaped from the entanglement of a personal guarantee, and the more so as on former
occasions this question was made the crucial test of our sincerity, and
upon it, indeed, the Simla negotiations of 18"1 are believed to have
been finally shipwrecked.
It may seem to be an ungracious-almost an unpatriotic-task
to expose the weak points, if there are any, of the alliance that we
have formed. Napoleon's famous advice ' to wash dirty linen a t home '
has become proverbial, and no doubt there are occasions when it may
be inexpedient for a Government to take the public too much into its
confidence ; but i n r e g a d to our Afghan policy, I am disposed to
deprecate any attempt a t concealment. If, as is asserted by Lord
Lytton's critics, we blundered into war and have still more blundered
into peace ;if the barrier that we have sought to establish on the northwest frontier of India be no barrier ; if the hollowness, the insecurity,
and the expense of our Afghan alliance constitute an evil not less
hurtful or far-reaching than Shir Ali's direct hostility, then let the
miscarriage of our policy be made known while there is yet time to
retrieve our position. Of all possible political dilemmas a fool's paradise is the worst. It is i n a spirit, then, of strict impartiality, with
no desire to exaggerate our advantages or to ignore the dangers of
the future, that I proceed briefly, and according to such lights as I
possess, to estimate and compare the pros and cons of the Treaty of
Gandamak.
The value of Yacdb Khan's engagement to place his foreign relations in our hands and to be guided entirely by our advice, depends
of course, i n the first place, on the stability of his power. That
power cannot be regarded at present as completely established. There
is insurrection in Badakhsh&n, where Mir Baba Khan, the nephew
of the hereditary chief Jehandar Shah, has with the assistance of the
chiefs of Shign&nand Darwiiz-both of whom, it must be remembered,
are more or less dependent upon Bokhara, and through Bokhara up on
Russia, whose acquiescence in the enterprise was thus indispensable
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t o its success-lately expelled the Afghan Governor, and proclaimed
his own independence of Cabnl. There is some reason to apprehend
that a similar revolution may be attempted at Herat, ~vhere Yac6b
Khan's own brother, AgGb Khan, who vas for many years, during
Shir Ali's lifetime, a refugee and pensioner at Teheran, is reported
t o be inclined to throw off his allegiance to Cabul, hopin;0 to revive
that condition of voluntary vassalage to Persia which, although unrecognised by treaty, has been the normal condition of the \Testenl
Afghan Principality, almost from the time of Yar 3Iah0med'~death.
There are likely also to be troubles at Sir-i-pG1 and I1I-j-meneh and
even a t Balkh, where Uzbeg influence has always to a certain extent
prevailed, and where Abdur-Rahman, YacGb Khan's most formidable
rival, may be expected, unless withheld by Russia, to avail himself of
every opportunity to foment intrigue and disaffection. But vith all
these drawbacks, the prospect is not on the whole unfavonrable. One
of the best informed, indeed, of the Afghan nobles, the son of that
arch-intriguer, NCr Mahomed Shah, who died a t Peshamer during
the Conference, lately stated it as his opinion to our Political Agent
at Candahar that ' Yaciib Khan mould have little &fiiculty in establishing himself firmly on the throne, not because he was S& Mi's
son or because the people liked him, but because he mas our nominee ;'
and this sentiment has been repeated in numerous quarters, and by
the best authorities in the country. For my own part, having already
committed myself to the opinion that if we had continued our s u b
sidy to Shir Ali Xhan, after Dost J'lahomed's death, 'he would have
nipped insurrection in the bud and thus escaped iive years of internecine war,' I am only too rejoiced to see the error of 1863 redeemed
in 1879, and confidently anticipate that success for the son which,
under similar circumstances, I predicted for the father, although in
the meantime local difficulties have no doubt increased, and the
situation has been much aggravated by Russia's mingling in the
fray.
The next question to consider is the rectification of frontier.
Now, it seems to me that, i n so far as regards local requirements, an
undne impo~tance has been given to the distinction between a
scientific ' and a haphazard ' frontier. No frontier, however scient%c, unless it be constructed on the scale of the great wall of Chins,
can be locally effective as a barrier against the inroads of barbarous
tribes. If, indeed, we had secured every great pass in the Sulim&n
range by military posts a t the upper as well as the lower encl, so as
ice take the Taziri tribes and their allies in reverse, we still couldnot
haye dispensed with police patrols for the protection of the villagers of
&heplain against raiders from the hills, who might swarm down upon
any exposed point from the multitudinous minor ravines. All that we
seem to have aimed a t in the treaty, and all that has been roba ably contemplated since the frontier question calve into prominent notice,
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has been the establishment of certain posts upon the Afghan border
which would afford the greatest combined amount of political and
military strength-political strength in dominating the regions beyond with a view to moral support as well as to pressure, and military
strength in obtaining commanding strategical positions that might
serve equally for attack and defence.
The political question may be first considered. The Khyber
Pass is not perhaps naturally the most convenient avenue of
approach t o India from the north, but it has now oome to b e
considered the high road of communication, and as long as the Afghan
capital remains a t Cabul, and the British frontier head-quarters are
fixed at Peshawer-to say nothing of the convenience of the Indus
bridge a t Attock and of the railway from Lahore to be extended
to that point-so long will this line form our chief object of attention. It will excite no surprise, therefore, that in the interests of
commerce, as well as to strengthen our position a t Peshawer, we
should have decided permanently and effectively to occupy this celebrated defile from its mouth to Lundi Khana (together with t h e
parallel pass of Michni) ; not, however, taking over t h i ~narrow strip
of land from the Afghan Government either i n cession or assignment,
but assuming the passes to have always belonged to the independent
Khyber tribes, who at the beginning of the war formally transferred
the control to our hands on certain definite conditions of service and
subsidy, which conditions are still, and will continue to be, in force.
It is probable that, for a time a t any rate-so inveterate are t h e
lawless habits of the Pass Afridis-the maintenance of a free communication through the Khyber may be a task of dificulty and
danger. The Government of India, indeed, has shown its sense of t h e
importance of the duty by naming a special officer to the charge ;
but as time rolls on and the security and convenience of regular
monthly payment is contrasted with the risks of plunder and t h e
fluctuations of a compulsory black-mail, it is hardly possible t o
doubt but that the tribes will be gradually humanised and brought
under effective control. A more serious inconvenience may perhaps
be felt in the jealousy and distaste with which the Cabul authorities
must naturally view our appropriation of a strip of country over
which i n ordinary times they may not have exercised jurisdiction,
but to which they have always asserted a territorial right, and where,
indeed, they have put that right in force by garrisoning Ali Masjid
whenever the military necessity for such an occupation has arisen.
The most important frontier arrangement, however, in its effect
upon our relations with Cabd, is no doubt the retention i n our own,
hands of the protection and administrative control of the district of:
Kuram. This extension of our military frontier, giving us, a t a.
minimum of cost and responsibility, a commanding hold upon Cabul,.
was strongly advocated by Sir Herbert Edwardes more than twenty

1879,

TL

y e a r s ago, a

d either then
MahomedK

a m e a s u r e of

and n a t i o n a

10,0001. pel
and that t h
valley mouk
strength. 2
followed w
temporarily
being consi
cated b y hi1
established
US,
moreov
offence or (
settled by
which our
the e n t r a n
Thal ; and
A f g h a n ser
A l i Kheil,
and t h e 2
remaining
supervisio
t r i b e s of p
d u r i n g om
citizens;
dealing w
political s
Our g
P i s h i n qu
the broad
demonstrt
be remerr
be n o do1
appointm
not t o m

resistance

i Y.

1879.

he Afghan border
t of political and
: the regions besure, and military
itions that might
The Khyber
"ient avenue of
loJv come to be
ong as the Afghan
lead-quarters are
nce of the Indus
t o be extended
E object of attenthe interests of
~t Peshawer, we
occupy this cele,gether with the
t h i ~narrow strip
n or assignment,
the independent
nally transferred
as of service and
: to be, in force.
~eterateare the
of a free cornf diEculty and
1 its sense of the
to the charge;
cnce of regular
hinder and the
~ I l ypossible to
d and brought
ice may perhaps
cibul authorities
~f country over
ccl jurisdiction,
qht, and where,
king Ali Masjid
11has: arisen.
jr, in its effect
ion in our own
the district of
iving us, at a
Id upon Cabul,
e than twenty

I

A

a

'

3

THE XESULTS OF THE AJ'GHAN WAR.

385

Years ago, and the scheme vould have been probably carried out,
either then or a t a later period, as a means of support to Dost
>lahorned Khan's authority, but for the uncompromising opposition
of Sir John Lawrence, who, indeed, as it is well known, would, as
a measure of policy, have surrendered all our Trans-Indus possessions
to t h e Afghans. Sir H. Edwardes pointed out that the Kuram frontier
was but five marches from Cabul through the open and fertile valley
of Logur ; that the Bangash and Tiiri tribes, who formed the great
bulk of the inhabitants, mere opposed to the Afghans both in religion
and nationality, and thus naturally looked to the English for protection ; that the communication between Kuram and our base on the
Indus valley was perfect ; that the net revenue, amounting to about
10,0001. per annum, would meet all the expenses of civil government,
and that the location of a force of four or five thousand men in the
valley mould place our frontier defences on a footing of unassailable
strength. Sir H. Edwardes' recommendations have not been implicitly
followed under the present arrangement, the district being onlj
temporarily assigned to us, and the force detailed for the occupation
being considerably below his estimate ; but the essential point advocated by him has at any rate been secured, a British garrison being now
established in a position which politically dominates Cabul, and gives
us, moreover, a strategic post of immense importance, either for
offence or defence. The boundaries of the Kuram district are to be
settled by a Commission. They will probably not include Khost,
which our recent experience has shown to be much exposed, though
t h e entrance to that valley will always be commanded by our post at
Thal ; and it would further, perhaps, be a prudent act of deference to
Afghan sensibilities if our direct control mere not extended beyond
Ali Kheil, the administration of the hill country between that point
and the Shutar-gardan, which has hitherto appertained to Kuram,
remaining with Yaciib Khan's officers, subject, however, to our friendly
supervision. It is hardly to be expected that the Mangals and Jhjis,
tribes of pure Afghan extraction, who have given us so much trouble
during our recent occupation, will at once settle down into peaceful
citizens; but even if they continue their depredations, the mode of
dealing with them xi11 be a mere question of police and devoid of
political significance.
Our general political interests are more involved, perhaps, in the
Pishin cluestion than in that of the Khyber Pass or of Kuram, On
t h e broad ground of protecting India from invasion or from hostile
demonstration from the west-and this ground constitutes, it must
be remembered, the main political value of Afghanistan-there can
be no doubt of the extreme importance of Candahar ; and great disappointmeat has been accordingly expressed at our avowed intention
n o t to maintain that position. Having occupied the city without
resistance ; having overcome all difficulties of carriage and communi-
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with our base; being on the best terms with the inhabitants of
the province-for the isolated attacks of fanatics cannot be held to
Titiate the generally friendly bearing of the people; enjoying the
amenities and the sanitary blessings of an admirable climate;
with ample shelter for our troops, and with supplies of all descriptions-not
only necessaries but luxuries-pouring in upon us in
profusion; why, i t is asked, should we voluntarily surrender all
these special advantages, the fruits of our conquest, and retire
witKn the I<hoja-Amr5n hills, mhere eve17 convenience of settlement has yet to be created? The answer is simply this, that the
principle of the retrocession of Candahar mas indispensable to the
success of our negotiations and general arrangements with Yaciib
Khan. ?Trhether he would have consented t o a peace which did
not provide for such a territorial restoration may be doubted;
but even if he had so consented under pressure it would have been
almost suicidal on our part to have accepted his acquiescence. Our
object, i t must be repeated, mas to create a strong friendly and
independent pomer ' on the north-west frontier of India ; whereas, if
we had forcibly dissevered Candahar from Cabul, Werat would have
infallibly followed suit, Turkestiin would have next seceded, and the
Afghan monarchy mould have been irretrievably split up and destroyed. Under certain conditions-that is, if Cabul were decidedly
hostile, as she threatened to become during the later years of Shir
Ali's rule-this dismemberment of the Afghan State might not be a n
undesirable consummation, but it was manifestly not to our advantage to risk such a catastrophe at the present time, with Russia and
Persia matching eagerly for an opening to interfere ; and we have accordingly very properly, as I think, resisted on broad political grounds
the temptation to include Western Afghanistan among the assigned
clistricts.
Whether at the same time it may not be advisable to arrange for
the temporary retention of our garrison in a post of such strategic
importance as the town of Candahar, after the civil government of the
province kts been restored to the hands of Afghan officials, is a question that is well morthy of consideration, and to which I shall again
refer when discussing our military frontier. As the treaty stands a t
present, Candahar is definitively abandoned to the Afghans, and our
troops are by amicable arrangement to evacuate the district as soon
as the weather admits of the movement, retiring across the Khojak
Pass upon Pishin, which we are to hold upon the same terms as Kuram
and Sibi. Now, Pishin is in many respects well suited for the site of
a frontier cantonment. The valley is compact and of moderate extent,
well watered and cultivated, and inhabited for the most part by
industrious Tor-Tirins and Syuds, who are employed either in agriculture or trade, and are likely t o prove obedient and orderly subjects,
while their immediate neighbours, the Atchikzyes of the Khoja-Amr5n
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r a n g e , and the Western Kakers, are among the least turbulent of the
A f g h a n tribesmen. And although a t first sight it might seem
P r o b a b l e that friction would arise from the strange medley of jurisd i c t i o n s which rill prevail under the new treaty arrangement in the
d i s t r i c t s betaeen Candahar and Cutchee, that objection need not much
d i s t u r b us. North of the Khojak Pass, for instance, the Cabul Amir
will be supreme ; while to the south of the range, in the assigned
d i s t r i c t of Pishin, English lam will prevail. Quetta again, the Bolan
P a s s , and adjoining districts, mill belong to Kelat, with the exception
of Sibi, which is temporarily assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandam a k ; while the Afghan Kakers, through whose country will lie the
o n l y lines of direct communication between Pishin and the Indus
v a l l e y , are virtually independent of Cabul, and the Belooch tribes of
IkTurrie and Boogtie, further south, between the Kaker country and
S i n d e , are virtually independent of Kelat. But practically, no doubt,
we shall do pretty mnch as we please throughout the entire region,
a n d , indeed, I can only look on the present nominal reservation of
r i g h t s as the transition stage betmeen independence and annexation.
The military aspect of the frontier rectification must be considered
separately. It is desirable in the first place to formalise the orograp h i c a l statistics of the frontier-that is, to show the several routes by
w h i c h armies at different periods of history have crossed the mount a i n s leading from the Afghan plateau upon India. Alexander traversed the Yussofzye country, north of the CabuI river, along a line
almost impracticable to a modern army ; while throughout the
Buddhistic period which succeeded the Greek, if we may judge by
t h e monuments which line the entire route from Cabul to the Indus,
t h e Indo-Scythian invaders must have always followed the present
h i g h road by Jellalabad and the Khyber to Peshawer. When Ghazni
became the capital, the ordinary route led by Gardiz and F u r m a t o
Bunnoo, a t the foot of the mountains, this being the line described
b y Bircni, vho was a t Mahmud's Court, as vell as by the contemporary geographer Mokadassi ; but during the rude of the later
Ghaznevides, as well as under the Ghoride kings, who founded the
c i t y of Kermhn on the southern slopes of the Sufid-koh, the Kuram
valley seems to have become the high road of commerce and mar,
though the Khyber Pass-that
is, the line from. Farshabfir to
Xagrahar (Peshamer to Jellahbad)-was sometimes followed. Chenghiz Khan and Tirnur both elected in their invasions of Illdia the
Hariy&b and Kuram route, while Baber, who himself came down the
Khyber, gives the preference, after full inquiry, to the route through
t h e FurmGl valley, as the shortest and easiest passage of the mountains. Of the remaining passes further south I may add that there
i s no instance, as far as I know, of an army having ever passed by the
Gomal or Ghmalari route, though, as the shortest in distance, it is the
favourite caravan line at the present day from Candahar to the Indus
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valley. The usual route from Candahar or the vicinity to the southeast has always been by the Tall-ChotiBli valley, recently explored
and mapped by General Biddulph, Baber having passed through this
region-which is tolerably open after the Sulimhn range has been once
turned-to
Ghazni, and Prince D&rB Shekoh to Candahar. Nadir
-Shah alone of all the historical invaders of India seems to have
traversed the Bolan Pass.
No doubt these historical traditions had their due weight i n
determining the Viceroy to limit his frontier rectification to t h r e e
principal points. His first consideration would be that by holding
and fortifying the Khyber and Michni passes, all approach t o
Peshawer from the west and north would be effectually barred, while
a t the same time Jellalabad would be placed, as it were, permanently
under fire. It would be evident i n the next place that the occupation of Kuram, supported by a strong post a t Thal, and t o be connected
in due course with the Punjab Railway system, would be a most important military arrangement, commanding as it would the three lines
by FnrmGl, by Khost, and by the Piwar Pass; while, a t the same
time, the control exercised by us over the Shutar-gardan Pass from
our extreme frontier post a t Ali Kheil would virtually place the town of
Cabul a t our disposal, thedistance from the pass to the Capital being
only about sixty miles through the open and well-watered valley of
Logur. The third point, Pishin, selected by the Viceroy for rectification, has the same strategic importance for Western Afghanistan
that Kuram possesses for the eastern division of the country, inasmuch as all the various routes from the Indus to Candahar by t h e
Zhob, the Bori and the Tall-Chotitili valleys, as well as the high road
by the Bolan and Quetta, concentrate i n the plain of Pishin, from
whence they are severally continued to the north by one or other of
the various easy passes which intersect the Khoja-Amr&n range. Our
best strategicel authorities, headed by Lord Napier of Magdala and
General Hamley, are of opinion that, in view of the probable requirements of the situation a t no distant period, Candahar itself is a far
stronger and a far more desirable military position than Pishin, notwithstanding the increased difficulty which its occupation would
involve of communicating with India, and notwithstanding t h e
unsymmetrical conto~uwhich would be given to the frontier by so
abrupt and extensive a projection of British territory to the northward ; and I confess that as a military man I am strongly inclined t o
adopt their reasoning. Looking, indeed, to the certainty that i f
military danger does approach India, it must cgme, not from t h e
north, but from the north-west, as the line of least resistance, and
foreseeing the necessity, under such circumstances, of keeping a
vigilant wateh upon Herat, where the great interest of the situation
will be focussed, I feel the utmost reluctance to give up our hold on
Candahar, fio admirably fitted as it is both for observation and for
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support, Now, I have never coveted nor recommended the annexat i o n of ViTestern Afghanistan. On t h e contrary, 1 have freqnently
Pointed out that to 11ndert:~ke the responsibilities of the ciril governbe a source to us of weakness rather than
m e n t of the province wo~~lcl
of strength, and I have now brought forward the additional argument
t h a t t o amputate a limb of this magnitude from the Afghan State a t
t h e present juncture would be to wreck the monarchy ; but a mere
temporary military occupation, guarded from all semblance of administ r a t i v e interference, and undertaken with the full approval.of the Cabul
Government,, does not seem to me to be open to the same objection, but,
on the contrary, to be nothing more than a legitimate-almost a
necessary-precaution of defence, when a serious Russian expedition
is advancing from the Caspian with the scarcely disguised object of
threatening the frontier of Herat. So strong, indeed, is my convict i o n of the soundness of this view, so self-evident does it apFear to
m e that as the Russian cloud spreads to t h e eastward, and begins to
darken over Merv, the Afghans must needs put all jealousy on one
s i d e and i n the instinct of self-preservation apply to us for aid to
m e e t the storm, that I.should almost doubt if the order for retiring in
September from Candahar would really be carried out ; or if, in order
t o fulfil the letter of the treaty engagement, the British troops were to
cross the Khojak Pass at the appointed time, I should look with confidence to their return a t no distant date on Yacilb Khan's own requisition, and with the view of furnishing an auxiliary column for the
defence of the western frontier of Afghanistan. I shall glance again
at this question of the surrender of Candahar when I come to consider
t 2 h eprogress and probable results of the Russian advance.
The remaining articles of the treaty do not require any very
special consideration. The amnesty clause supplies a want that was
deeply felt when we evacuated the Afghan country in 1842. On that
occasion the native Minister, who had supplied the Candahar army
during the whole period of trouble, b u t for whose safety, in spite of
all my efforts to the contrary, no precautions were taken, said t o me
w i t h bitter emphasis as the last troops marched out of the town,
You have saved yonr o m army, b u t you have sacrificed us;' and,
i n point of fact, on the return of the Barnckzye Sirdars, the Minister
a n d hi.; family, who were the heads of the ParsiwBn community of
Candahar, were destroyed root and branch, to our deep humiliation
and, I will even say, disgrace. I t is happy for our national reputation, and for the consciences of our ofiicers, that a more humane
a n d considerate policy now prevails.
On the question of maintaining British officers in the country,
rnhich became a rallying cry in the late party contests on the Afghan
mar, i t is remarkable that Yactib Khan took a diametrically opposite
viem to that which his father maintained, or at any rate professed to
maintain. Shir Ali mould have admitted British agenta in the

provinces, but interdicted their residence a t Cabul, on the score of dong t h e 01
personal danger. Yaciib Khan, on the contrary, argued, with a far 0c-i ~ C a s ~
greater show of reason, that a t Cabul, where his rule was supreme, he
with
could guarantee the protection of his guests, whereas a t a distance b o u g h
there might always be a risk of outrage. Practically, British officers
mill, I believe, under the new arrangements, associate with the
Afghan chiefs very much as Russian officers associate with the Begs
of the outlying districts of Xokand and Bokhara, regarded no doubt
occasionally as troublesome interlopers, but not exposed to any special three pain\
danger. British political officers, indeed, in responsible positions and v
ita
a
brought into close intercourse with native races, are as a rule soon mildest an
, far as they are Afrrdfs an1
encircled with a halo of personal affection, ~ h i c h as
individl-ially concerned, is a better safeguard than sabres and bayonets, and. especjl
and which, moreover, largely adds to the influence and dignity of the a d v i s a b l e
Government.
dieculta1
The 6th and '7th Articles of the Treaty of Gandamak, providing of l i t t l e d
for the security and extension of our trade with Afghanistan and the
would be1
countries beyond, do not seem to have as yet attracted much attention
moment
either i n England or in India ; but in Russia a cry has already gone
essayed t
up under the soreness of disappointed monopoly which exaggerates the
s ~ l i etn pd
importance of our success, and even places our commercial above our
probably 1
political triumph. The St. Petersburg Gazette (No. 140, of June 5,
P a s s fro
1879) thus laments over the situation :districts
c
onsisten!
There is now nothing to prevent the English from carrying out their long

7

TI

7

1

9

cherished commercial designs in Central Asia, and in the markets of the western
confines of China. It may be presumed that these designs will f i s t exhibit themselves in the form of a railway, northward from Peshawer. But the English will at
the same time endeavour to carry another of their contemplated designs into =ecution. They will try to cut us off from the markets of Western China. For this
purpose they will seek first to establish their commercial and then their political
influence in Kashgaria. This they attempted to do when Kashgar was governed
by YacGb Beg. . . . If our merchandise is ousted from the markets of Kashgaria,
our commerce will suffer in Bokhara and throughout all Turkestrin, and we must
never forget that trade in Uentral Asia is the great lever of political influence.

Now, this note of alarm, though premature, is significant, and
points to the direction in which, in the true interests of commerce,
me should now labour. Whatever may be the import and export
duties agreed upon for our direct trade with Afghanistan, care should
at any rate be taken in the Commercial. Treaty about t o be negotiated
for the adoption of the lowest possible scale of transit dues, so that, in
fair and reasonable competition with Russia, we may throw our
Indian produce and home manufactures into Kashgaria through
Chitrsl or Badakhshgn, and may receive Chinese commodities in
return. The commercial ventures opened with Western China
through Thibet and Cashmir have hitherto proved a financial failure,
bnt if the Afghan and Dard tribes are fsiendly there seems to be no
reason whatever why a really profitable trade should not be pushed
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along the open Chitr&lvalley and over the Biroghil Pass to Yarkend
a d Kashgsr, where we certainly ought to be able to compete successfully with the Russian caravans creeping laboriously from the T-olga
through '&&end,
or from the Caspian by Bokllara and Sarnar-

"

i

associate
It mill be observed that no notice is taken in the treaty of our
tl,e
meen i'ssOgate with the Begs relations
any of the independent tribes excepting those con"lihara7 regarded no doubt nea
with t& Khyber Pass, notwithstanding that our position at
' "'it 'lotexposed
special three points above the passes must necessarily brhg us in contact
'"I'
responbible
positionsand I with a large mountaineer population, comprising some of the
raCeSyare
a rule 8or.
wildest and most m l i l y clans in the country, sceh as t,he Southern
ia'i' u'lichJ as far as they are ~ f and
~ Urakzyes,
< s ~the Jfijis and %langals, the 3 i i r s ~ dYaairis
tbilns3~resandba~~neta, and especially the Tjrins and Kakers. It T a s probably thought
C?
ili'ilence and dignity ofthe 1
to have our hands as free as possible in dealing with SO
i difficult a question, where the sympathy of the Cabul Court could be
of G a n d ~ kp, ~ ~ ~ i d xttle
i ~ ~
where engagements, indeed, on either side
use to us,
""
Afghanistan and the
be not only inoperative but misleading. It is not for a
'" yct attracted much attention
momentto be imagined, as some sanguine cartographers have
a Cry has already gone
essayed to prove, that ihe new frontier is to be aligned on the
districts. The real red line will
"'""~~b
~ ~ l l i exaggeratesthe
ch
salientpointsof the
"'+
probably only be advanced about twenty-four miles up the Khyber
commercial aboveollr
Q r r s e ~(yo.
~ ~ 140, of June 5,
pass from Jamrfid to Lundi-Khans; and even in the assigned
I
districts the limits on all sides will be retrenched as far as is
consistent~ t , hmilitary exigencies ; but still, with every disposiEsfl from carrying out their lolls
tion to err on the side of moderation rather than of excess, it is
.*ld in bl~emarkets ofthe wesi87n
, certainthat under the Gmdamak arrangement our relations with the
designs vill first exhibit them.
' w ~ But
~ the~English
~ d- l st
independent ~ f g h a ntribes must be largely developed ; and herein
ir eoliem~lateddedgnsinto
execulies the danger, or rather the inconvenience, of the new situation'i*'tr
China.
this
F~~instance,the Shinvaris, the TT&is,the Uralcjrzes and the 3bngals
JmI*rcid and then their political
be curbed, and the Jfahsud Vazirih who have never yet been
12 do
gashgar magoremed
'a f i ~ mthe rnnrkeh of Kn8hoOaIia, punished f o ~their raid upon Tank and other excesses committed
during the war, mush sooner or later receive a severe and salutary
f 1 ~ 0 d~ lt T~rkestBn,and
muat
*tdIsvcr (3f political influence.
1 lesson,while on the
hand a liberal blackmail must be b ~ s t o r e d
{
on
the
Afridfs
and
Mohmends
of the K h ~ b e r ;and if direct 'Om-iimntllre, is
and
between
munications,
commercial
or
military,
are to be kept
true interests of commerce,
require
Pishin and the Indus valley, the Tirins and Kakers
b,: tho import and export
be
largely subsiclised Altogether I do not pretend to lookOn the
i t h Afghneistm, care
I
new frontier arrangements as economical. On the
rrcaaly
*buttobe negotiated
;
but
any
if they do not entail an increase Of
be
,iC? @ftrtzn&
dues, so that, in
lztImi8,.rr,e may throw our
such
will be more than counterbalanced
the a-'
intu ~
~ through~
h
~
~
OW~ general
i position~ and giving
$c IX~iaeso commodities in
an
remains to consider the amount of subsidy.
aned
WesEtm China
1t
it
at one time raised again& paying a vanquished
a financial failure,
1
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seems on fllrther consideration t o be now generaUy admitted that the
laid out, illat, i n fact, if the conditions of the bargain
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mile etlould not be pushed
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are duly observed, the tranqaction is a rely favourable one for Indict,instance two military posts-- 01
sir lakhs of rupees a year being a very moderate insurance upon our buchnre of the Oxus, and t h e ot
inaugr
- Indian revenues against actire anuoynuce from the iiltrinues of Rut firmrdsin
to
that
period
there
was
sin. If mar, indeecl, Tere to Si1peY.r-enein connection with the pen,jt'
v
o
nations
inp Tureoman Expedition, rre should be prepared, no doubt, in our l " ~ c O m ~ ~ ~ '
own interests to raise the i4f..l!an subsidy to the amount allotted ta by any relations, political or con
On to
former ruler8 of Cahd, or even to increase i t according to the eni- W S thus no
,,,13posin
that
there
mere
such el
gencies of our ally's position.
Christian
~
o
~
v e rDu
The best practical mode of gauging the ~ a l u eof a treaty, a mode hDy
more true ancl more sound thrzn nny criticism however searclling and 1873, some of the Turcornan t r
with
honest, is bp observing the effect produced by it 011 neighbobouringi true, come into
is a d Tekehs~vho have been
States; and if we apply this test, in tlie present instance, the
in the highest degree satisfactory. Xot only, indeed, has the
Russian hostility, held
"
quar
ising influence of the Gandamak settlement been perceptible at all the two years later that
native Courls of India-st Gwalior and Indore as well as a t Hyderabad 3,ssumed any serious proportionc
and Sepaul-but we are assured that a still more decided effect has
Since 1875, however7 Russ
been produced in Persia, where the unexpected triumph of our arms, the Akhds and Tekehs and th
combined with our unexampled moder:~tion as victors, has createcl on the pretext that they interr~
quite a revulsion of feeling i n our favour ; and if any further proof tion betrveell Krasnovodsk and '
were needed of a belief in the completeness of our success, it might uearest point is 200 miles dii!
be found not on!yin the language of the Russian press, which betrays settlements; sometimes she ha
a painful sense of national humiliation, but also in the attitude which arms in order to protect t h e
the Russian Government has assumed in consequence of the Afghan n e i g l l b o ~;~and
~ sometimes, a
war, and in the retaliatory efforts which it is now bent, on making the sympathy uf Eltrope i n t h e
in order to recover its prestige. ' YOLWAfghan successes,' said a - claims that it is the mission of high Rzssian functionary a t the commencement of the present year, throughout the East. L e t it
' will compel US to take Nerv, whether we like i t or not. We cannot severd pleas are a mere sham
afford to be driven out of Cabul at the mere threat of an English the Tnrcomans are, i n fact, th(
17iceroy. Our Empire is founded on prestige as much as yours, and i t fhle, aud that the real ground
becomes therefore a matter of State necessity that we shoLzldredress a d;l'f'erent direction. s u c h ;
the balance in Central Asia.' I n this pregnant sentence-which,
dwofold. I n the first place,
howeyer, is false and misleading in so far that i t confounds cause
olidation of Russian power i
with effect, and imputes an aggressive character b what was strictly
=pded lines of cornmrlnica
a measure of defence-we have, I think, a true explanation of the
xus, across the Steppes i d
grounds of the great expedition which is now marching to the eastseconclly,it has d r a y s been
ward from the Caspian, an expedition which may lead to consequences sccept,eclby her as a fixed pril
of the first political magnitude, and to which accordingly, in conadvallce to the Afghan fron
tinuation of a long series of mollitory addresses on the some subject,
regard to Eno1and, a n d the
I n o r propose to draw particular attention.2
European pol~tlcs.
.'? * Bearing t
The connection of Russia with the Turcomans is of recent date.
ceeclto record her progress.
It is only7 indeed, ten Years ago that Russian troops made their
tl:
T - , ~various
descent upon the east shore of the Caspian, establishing in the first the starting-points of Krasno
=*k.
~ n addition to the series of esmps published in & , ~ ~ b , uOi , L ztuaia
~
i n $he E ~ ~ 1878
, were mere reconnaisfls~n
1875, I wollld refer the reader to two recent papers: 1. '
~ and the
~ Indian
~
~ the temper
i
~of the tribes and ]
Frontier,' in the &zlartol.ly h ' c v b ~ ~for January 1879; and 2. The Road to Merv,'
Vb.-ce. Last year, for t h e fir$
rvo?ttt82y Rccord of RogaZ Gcogrnphical SorictZ/ f o r March 1879.
VOL. VI.-NO. 30.
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been intended t,han a mere demonstration. The column of 3,000 men
amply provided with carriage and supplies, which left Cbikishlar
July 1876 under General Lomakin, had been evidently organised with
a view of co-operating with the TnrkestBn forces then marching under
Icaufmann in persou against the Afghan frontier. Merv or Herat mas
probably the ultimate object of the expedition; and if the advance of
the main body across tile Oxus had been prosecuted, and Persian
opposition from the Khorassan border had been ne~ztralised-as i t
probably would have been under the circumstances-there is no reason
why Lomakin shoulld not have fully accomplished his design.
By
the month of August, however, when the Russian troops had reacher1
the Alihal border, 250 miles from the Caspian, and panic was beginning to spread among the tribes of the Steppe, the "Ian of a Central
Asian campaign had collapsed in consequence of the signing of the
Treaty of Berlin, and it only remained for Lomakin to withdraw his
men from their advanced and unsupported position, an operation
nrliich he performed in a masterly manner, and with a loss, as i t is
stnted on the best authority, of 'only two killed and four or five
wounded.)
This year's proceedings have been condi~ctedon a scale of far
greater magnitude and completeness. Several months have been
occupied in preparation. Some of the best officers in the Russian
service have been appointed to comnlands, incl~zdingMajor-General
Borch for the infantry and Prince Witgenstein for the cavalry, with
Colonel Prozorkevitch in charge of the artillery and Co~zntMalama
as head of the staff, the supreme command being a t the same time
placed in the hands of General Lazareff, a man of no family and not
much educat,ion, but a thorongh soldier and, what is still rarer in the
Russian army, a man of unimpeachable character. The infantry
force, composed mainly of the twenty-first division, .rrhich has been
~vitlidra~vn
for this purpose from the army of the Caucasus, is said to
amount to 16,000 men ; the cavalry, consisting of two Cossack regiments, a regiment of regular dragoons (whose employment is supposed

id

.

estimated as the artillery strength, furnished with thirty-six field guns,
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mn of 3'000men9
bably be the same as that p~~rsued
last year by Lomakin, along ilre
eft Chikishlar in *trek and the Simbar to Kh-oja-Kalasi and Bend-i-Has~anon the
'Iy Organised with northern face of the Kursn-D6gh s n g e ; and as far asthis point-about
under 250 miles from the Caspian-vhere the Akhal settlements commence,
Or
no serious opposition is to be erpscted. Beyond, i t is not easy at present
if the
to forecast the progress of erents. The Akhals, nho are still much
Lted9and Persian
elated at Lomakin's supposed failure of last year, talk of a resolute
Leutralised-as it resistance and threaten to dispute every inch of ground between
there is
reason Kizil-Arvai and Deregez ; but those who know them best are very
his
Unless openly supported by the
I sceptical of any such heroic efforts.
'Oops
had
chiefs of the Kllorass&nborder, ~ 6 t the
h sanction of Persia, the Akhals
p a n i c mas beginmill, in all probability, melt away before the Russian arms, as on so
'lan of a
j many previous occasions have the Uzbegs, Kirghiz, and other kindred
he signing of the nations. The faint-hearted will come in ancl sue for terms ; the
his bolder spirit. will fall back as the Russians advance, leaving their
On'
an 'peration
forts and camps to the mercy of the vietor, and finally taking refuge
a loss,as it is with their brethren the Tekehs of Merv. And now to consider the
and
Or five
question of supplies from Persia, on which the succegs or failure of the
Russian expedition has been supposed to mainly depend-immense
'n
of far efforts have been evidently made t o render the force independent of
been Persian aid. Provision caravans in large numbers will follow in rear
rs in the Russian
of the columns, and as the recent harvest has been prolific, a certain
lg Major-Genera1
amount of grain will thus, no doubt, be found in the abandoned
the
with
6 ()bahsY of the Akhals, which extend in an unbroken series for nearly
nd Count h'alrm'
200 miles along the northern slopes of the Kuran-D8gh range ; but
at
same time
the main question, or what is suppored to be the main question,
no
and not
relates to the readiness or not of Persia to furnish further supplies
rarer in the
from the frontier districts of Khorass6~. Now, pntting aside for the
31.
The infant?.
moment all question of the struggle between England and Russia for
n 7 w'T1'ich has 'lee'
political influence at the Court of Teheran, it cannot be doubted that
aucasus) is said to
Persia, looking merely to her own interests, mud regard the intrusion
t w o Cossack regiis supposed
expedition. But it &ould be remembered that the circumstances of the present
'), and local levies , ,
, very different from the campaign of 18'73. On that occasion the lmes of
march from the respective bases of Kinderlinsk Bay, of Orenbnrg, and of Tashlrend,
while 500 Inen are
conducted through friendly or at any rate neutral districts to the ~ o i n of
t attackirty-Six field guns,
the liirgbiz of the Ust-Urt or Eara-kalpacks of the Kizil-kum being of no m~litary
This large army9 aCcounGsothat there vas no frittering away of strength by detaching troops en
horses--intended
~.,,,te ; whereas on the present expedition the entire route for 450 miles, from the
Caspian to the neighbonrhood of Merv, lies tbrough an enemy's country, where pree first time in the
cautions on a large and efficient scale will be necessary for the protection of convoys
3 Caspian, and the
and the maintenance of communication with the base. It is probable, indeed, that
Ouki,
leftChikishmore than one-half of General LazareE's large force will be thus employed on
escort or patrol duty, or in garrisoning a llne of posts in re= of the advancing
of rotlte mill prowhich it has been
~ h necessary
t
for the
to General Lazareff's

colmn-at Chat, a t Kizil-Arvat, at Geuk-tepeh, and a t Ashkabad-so that 6,000 or
6,000 fighting; men will be alone avadable for active operations t o the east of the
Akhal settlements, a force that tvould be hardly strong enough t o attack the Tekeh
position a t Merv, and still less to undertake a siege of Berat.

D
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of the Russian arms along her north-eastern frontier with profouncl
suspicion and dislike. Knowing, as the Persians do, the omnivorous
capacity of tile great Northern Octopus, i t cannot be agreeable to
them to iind a monster sucker enveloping the frontier of Khorassan
fiom Asterabad t o Serakhs; besides, the Shah has claims, of long
standing and fairly supported, on the allegiance both of the Akhals
and of the Tekehs, and if the Russian expedition succeed, such claims
are a t once wiped out for ever. It is clear, then, that whatever may
be his alajesty's personal leaning to his Russian friends, he cannot
possibly look on Lasareff's advance x-ith favour; but to adopt
lneasures t o thwart i t would be a very serious affair indeed, and might
provoke consequences vhich, vithont a direct pledge of support from
Englalid, fie conld not in common prudence encounter. As far as the
matter of supplies is concerned no great difficulty will probably occur.
Russia coulcl hardly demand substantive aid from Persia i n an expedition which not only threatens the Shah's territorial rights, but is
undertaken almost mithout disguise in a spirit of hostility to Englancl.
Active assistance from Persia in furnishing supplies may thus be left
out of the account; but, on the other hancl, witltholcling supplies by
coercive measures might fnrnish Russia, vith legitimate grouncl of
complaint. To establish, indeed, a cordon along the frontier so as to
prevent the inhabitaiits of Bujnoord, KGchkn, and Deregez from
selling the produce of tlieir fields LO the Russian commissariat ofLicerb
i n their immediate neighbo~zrhood-even if practicable, which may
be doubted-woulcl be a measure of a decidedly unfriendly character,
and might provolre reprisals. On the supply cluestion, then, i t may
be assumed that for the present Persia will observe a strict neutrality.
Brit there is beyond the supply question a question of right of territory, which is of far more importance, and on vhich neutrality is impossible. I f the Russian columns pursue their march to the eastvard
beyond the Akhal settlements, i n the directiolt either of Nerv or
Serakhs, they immediately enter on bow3 f i d e Persian territory.
Deregez, Abiverd, Chardeh, and Mehila, which the Russian officers complacently speak of as their contemplated basis of operations against
3lerv, are as much a part of Persia as is Asterabacl or Teheran ; and
there is no possibility of passing to the eastwarcl of the Akhal country
except along this line, for the desert to thc north is a u-aterless waste.
It may be presnmed that if General Lazareff is orclered to atbnck Jierv
he will, on his military responsibility, establish himself at such points
as are most convenient for his enterprise, mithout concerning himself
with the question whether he is or is not encamped on I'crsian territory ; but it is clear that such a violation of territo~yvould form :!
legitimate casus belli for Persia, and tllat, if she dicl llot resent thib
illvasion of her rights, we might vcry properly regarcl 11cr-as n consenting party to our injury and act accordingly.
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Until we are directly assured of Russia's hostile intentions; i t
astern frontier w i t h profoLInd
,,Persians do, t h e omnivoron, mould of c o m e be premature to suggest even such an extreme
measure as a defensive alliance wit11 Persia, which mould have so
IS, it cannot b e agreeable t,
ing the frontier of Khorassan many serious inconveniences; but it is quite on the cards that, as
,he Shah has claims, of long events become developed, that may be the least hazardous course to
llegiance both of t h e Akhal, $wrsue. If Russia, as there is strong reason to believe, is now
:pedition succeed, such claims pushing on to 3lerv or Scrakhs, not so much for the punishment of
ear, then, t h a t whatever m%y the slave-dealing- Tekehs-though that of course is blazoned to the
is Russian friends, he cannot world as the righteous object in view-as for the purpose of exerting
~ i t hfavour ; b x ~ t t o adopt a pressure on Afghanistan, and n~iththe ultimate hope of occupying
-ious affair indeed, and might Herat, then it might rery possibly be a sound policy t o extend to
Erect pleclge of support from Persia the provisions of the Asia Jfinor Protectorate, or even to
ncc encounter. A s far as the support her acti~elyin vindica~ingher rights upon the frontier of
difficulty mill probably occur. Rhorassgn. It is the nniversal belief i n the Russian army that
aid froin Persia in a n expeG- Herat is the real object of the present expedition, Turcoman punishh's territorial r i g h t s , but is ment being a mere by-game, or a t most a means to an end ; and i t
:pirit of hostility t o England, has even been suggested that an attempt will be made to secure the
~gsupplies m a y t h u s be left complicity both of Persia and of Ayi~hKhan in thus dealing a heavy
lid, withholding supplies by blow at the integrity of Afghanistan. I do not myself anticipate
wit11 legitimate ground of any such extreme and unjustifiable measure, but 1do see that in the
)n along the f r o n t i e r so as to present unsettled state of public feeling a t Cabul, and before the
Afghans have had time to realise the benefits of the English alliance,
E;cch&n, and Deregez from
iussiall commissariat officers if a strong Russian force he allowed to establish itself vithin hail of
the Herat frontier, very serious troubles are likely to ensue, troubles
n if practicable, which may
:idedly unfriendly character; not less pernicions in their character or less serious in their effect
than those which threatened t o arise from Stofitoff's establishment
pply question, then, it may
1 observe a strict neutrality, at Cab~~l.The u.izinzfts of Russia in undertaking the enormous expense
(calculated ac above a million sterling) and the heavy risk of sending
a question of r i g h t of ierri1 on which neutrality is im- a force of 20,000 men to the Oxus, is unmistakable. She is intensely
jealous of our Afghan triumph, and believes that her own prestige
their march to the eastward
and power are jeopardised by our success. She seems, indeed, to think
irection either of Blerv or
that a campaign similar in character and Bclnt to the conquest of Ichiva.
n& $cZe Persian tel-ritory.
ich t h e R~lssianofficers corn- * -even though it be similarly barren of substantive results-is indisbasis of operations ag.aiast , pensable to retrieve her position as the mistress of the destinies of
Central Asia ; and, holding further that that position is incompatible
Asterabad or Teheran ; and
vith our supremacy in the countries adjoining her southern frontier,
itward of the Akhal couutry
she may feel herself bound to put in action against us that same
e north is a waterless v{sste.
machinery
of intrigue and agitation which she directed against
ff is orderedto attack Ivlerri 1
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with
so much success i n the recent instances of Xervia and
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B~:dskhshGnand Vakniin-has been orgnnised, which may, for a time f h , 1 1
1 ~~
a t any rate, very seriously cripple the Afghan power to the north of P~-".bu21~
Pesai:
the Hindii-kush. Abdur-Rahman Khan, again, that storm-bird of ar-r12 ;sorneti
Afghan diplomacy, is still held in reserve at ,tamarcand, ready t o b ~ i ; ~ x l
swoop on TurkesCGn whenever his Russian friends may give therirk I skin, E
t
signal ; and a new aspirant for pomer, Iskender Khan, who represents j k b r t * h i r ~;.
the Herat branch of the Baruckzye governing family- being the eldest 'QQ" 3<t&~ksur~ivingson of the well-known Sultan Ahmed Khan-and who served gt i t t;tc1 :L 2
for somegears with distinction in the Rnssian army, has now appeared a,talarrBt~ x:
upon the scene, having been placed by the Persian Government id P:%&-.-c:d
to t
ii military commnnd upon the frontier, where he may prove a trouble- /6P:xre que;
some aeighbour to Taciib Khan and his oEcers. With the evidence 'C*-x-xrnecl are
before us of these elements of mischief available for the disturbance (nlnti3 is ;.till
of the Afghan settlement, and with the knowledge that any snch eit Earr by
disturbance must react upon our immediate frontier, we cannot to5
closely watch the progress of Lazareff's columns to the eastward.
It is true that the Russian Government has formally disavowed the
intention of attempting the present conquest of Merv ; b l ~ tthip
disavowal goes a very little way in reassuring ns as to the harmless- .gh nc.rln:: t
ness of the pending expedition. If Herat be the clestination of the ',%~--9 at i:: it
t.roops, Merv is entirely off the line of march, and would only b~ 5x1 illfluen
attacked in case of serious molestation from the Tekehs ; bnt in all !"l.-1:t~e dissi
probability neither Herat nor Merv is immediately threatened. i ' ~ ~ ~ ~ 7
There are many indications to show that the point a t mhich the - c * m l ~ i u c b
campaign of the present year will be brought to a close will be either merit, see
Deregez or Abiverd, where the Akhal settlements terminate, and f r o n t i e r f
before the Tekeh conntry is entered. This would be a very convenient *Pa@ 1~~~
centre from which to conduct negotiations with illerv upon one side, 'f"llere is
and with the Khoras~fin Government upon the other, while from the it settlemer
same point communications might also be opened up with Khiva :nx=tc~*"tte
treat
across the desert, and a direct pressure might further be exerted or, it
; slrpp"rt9.
Herat and the tribes in the neighbourhood.
And under such circumstances-that i ~supposing
,
a large Russia1 d9;r'lssi'i
force to be encamped at Abiverd (which is naturally the most fertilt .sl'e
district of the Attock,' though ruined a t present and almost unin !i mnxodify
OPP""~
habited, owing to the depreciations of the Tekehs), and supposing that
-yithcrat
this force, which r~-oul~l
immediately threaten illerv, mere in uninter
'?nt'igue'
ropted communication on one side with its base upon the Caspian, ant
.-l'carn
.
on the other with the Russian settlements on the Oxus-what mould b.'
t
h
e
Turc
the proper policy for the British Goverament to pursue? It may b
' . .2 n d mo
presumed that Russia could not have attained such a position withod
having encountered energetic protests both from England and Persit
from England, because we have already placed on reccrd the stronge
remonstrances against a Russian occupation of Merv, and, as far a:
,xt snch
Indian interests are concerned, all the arguments against the conqtlf
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l Agerv by a foreign Poser apply i n a still stronger degree to A biverd ;
which may, for a tirnelof
In Power to the north of from Persia, for two reasons : first,beo~usethe Shah hasal~vaysasserted,
'"in7
that storm-bird of:andsometimes realised, a territorial light to the Merv district-a PerLt Samarcand, ready to:sian army, indeed, having captowii tlia city and surrouoding country
I friends mag give tbehin1860, though subsequently cornpelleJ, thiough military miwonduct,
I
er Khan, who representsto retire ; and secondly, because Abivercl is an undisputed dependency
kmily-being theeldest of Kelat-i-Nadir, and its invasion by Russia must be held to conKhan-and who served stitute a gross violation of taritory. But v o d d such a violation be
army, haSnow appeared declared a casus belli by the Shah, and would Great Britain be pre1 Persian Government in pared to take up arms in support of her Persian ally? These are
h e may prove a trouble-/ grave questions, which I do not venture to answer. The interests conk ~ . With the evidence cerned are no doubt of the largest character. Russia has already made,
able for the disturbance and is still making, the most strenuous efforts to draw Persia to her side,
either by fair means or foul. A venal Court has been for the most part
lowledge that any
I frontier, w cannot too secured in her interest ; her officers are gaining influence and authority
hmns to the
wit11 the regular h s i a n army ; tile Shah's personal feelings have been
formally disavowed
powerfully wrought upon ; i t is now probable that pressure, and a pressure of the most urgent and persistent kind, will be applied. Unaided,
1st of Merv ; but
I 11s as to the harmless- i t seems to me that Persia must inevitably yield ; but if she does yield,
I the destination of the ,mhat is i t we have to expect ? An argument has been brought forwald
rch, and would only b6 i n influential quarters, that the Afghan settlement mnst be held to
1 the Tekehs ; but in all 'have dissipated all danger ; that alarms at the advance of Russia are
hmediately threatened, 'ow vain alarms ;that even if Merv mere taken, and Russia and Persia
he point at which the ,ombined threatened the Afghan border, the British-Indian Governto a close r i l l be either .men& secure in Yacilb Khan's fidelity, and in his mainhenance of the
Iements terminate, and frontier fortresses, of Herat and 3fymeneli especially, might laugh at
p l d be a very convenient , t h e machinations of its enemies and defy their efforts to annoy us.
ith Merv upon one side, There is much of fallacy, I beliere, in this argument. The ~ f ~ l l a n

/

other, while from the ,,settlement is a very good settlement as far as it goes, but i t is not im''htheopened
up with ava
maculate-it is not complete. To yield to us its full measure of defence,
further be exerted ot ithe treaty must be supplemented by all legitimate precautions and
1pposinga large ~~~~i~~
aturally the mostfertat
esent and almost unin
ehs), ancl
that
31erv,were in uninter
the caspian, an,
e
le ~ ~ ~ wo.L,ld
~ bto pursue ? ~t may b
such a position withod
rn &-,@and and per&
on reccrd the stronge
of ~ J I ~ as
~ far
~ tlr.
,
its against the conqllf
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supports. Persia must be detached from Russia codte que coiite.
Russia herself must not be left in any uncertainty as to our intentions.
,She must be made to understand, while there is yet time for her to
"modifyher aggressive preparations, that she will not be pel-mitted unopposed to establish herself in strength upon the Afghan frontier,
-either at Merv, or a t Serakhs, or even a t ,4biverd, nor to recommence
.intrigues against the British power in India. She might, indeed, be
warned
me were prepared in self-defence to support
~ ~ that,
h if~necessary,
t
,the Turcomans-with whom she has no legitimate quarrel-tvith arms
.>nd money, or even to turn the tables on her by encolnaging the
pfforts of the Uzbegs to recover their liberty. Above all, a t the
?resent time, .me must show ourselves strong upon the threatened
,contier, and equal to any emergency. It would be almost fatuity
* ~such
t a moment to withdraw our garrison from Chndahar. YacGb
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Khan must be made to see that it is as much for his interest a:
our own to hold an efficient body of British troops in such a positiol
that, on the approach of danger, and without any semblance ox
suspicion of interference with Afghan rights, they might, wit11
military alacrity, occupy Herat as an auxiliary garrison.
I cannot doubt that me are fhlly able to hold our own in the East, &
as well as in the West. All that is required is that me s h o ~ d dassume 1'
the firm attitude and the bold language of conscious st,rength and of
conscious right.
4
H. 6. EAWLIXPO~.
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